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ABSTRACT 
As today's Army moves further into the Information Age and its mission evolves 
into a CONUS-based, Force Projection Army with diverse mission requirements, the 
ability to collect and disseminate lessons learned never has been more important. Units 
must be able to use the lessons of those soldiers who have preceded them in order to 
maximize force multipliers, execute missions right the first time, and save lives. 
This research evaluates the impact that the implementation of an Information 
Technology infrastructure has had on the efficiency of Army's Lessons Learned Process 
and the overall effectiveness of the Center for Army Lesson Learned to conduct its 
primary mission. The objective is to determine how Information Technology has 
changed the organizational structure, culture, reward systems, processes, and personnel 
skill requirements within CALL. 
Research includes an in-depth review of CALL as the Army's mechanism for 
creating organizational learning, a description of the Lessons Learned Process, an 
efficiency comparison between the current and previous collection, an analysis of 
dissemination processes using Extend Simulation Software, and an explanation of the 
organization's current IT architecture. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.        BACKGROUND 
During the later stages of the Cold War, Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. 
Sullivan, concluded that the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin was not 
achieving its full potential in preparing its forces for combat. While NTC was effective 
at generating learning at the individual, team, or platoon level through the use of After 
Action Reviews, the real value of the process would be turning those lessons into 
organizational learning. To make the transition from individual learning to 
organizational learning required a structured mechanism for sharing this information. 
That mechanism would be the lessons learned process. 
To oversee this new mechanism, the Army created the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1985. CALL was tasked with capturing 
the learning taking place at the national training centers and disseminating it throughout 
the Army. CALL'S initial focus was to document successful tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP). NTC's success at developing combat prepared, CONUS-based heavy 
forces, led to the expansion of the training center concept. The Army created the Joint 
Readiness Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee for light forces, the Combat Maneuver Training 
Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels for OCONUS heavy forces, and the Battle Command 
Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth for division and corps staff officers. As 
the Combat Training Center (CTC) base expanded so did CALL to provide the same 
repository of lessons learned for all of these centers. 
1 
As a result of Operation Just Cause, CALL expanded its charter to include 
capturing lessons for actual operations. From the early 1990's CALL provided collection 
teams for all major Operations, including Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Operation 
Restore Hope.     Although the system for collecting data from the field was judged 
effective from the earliest moments, General Sullivan noted that, "CALL produced little 
of enduring value during it first several years because the data from the training centers 
overwhelmed the paper-and pencil system to analyze and distribute the information."1 
Although CALL confirmed that units often repeated the same mistakes, because of the 
long time delay in compiling and distributing the valuable lessons, most units fell victim 
to the same pitfalls.   In response to this deficiency CALL sought to incorporate the 
emerging information technology as a solution. 
In 1993, the CALL Database (CALL DB) was created. The CALL DB allows 
soldiers, trainers, and unit leaders to consult the Army's "corporate memory" with 
previously unprecedented speed, accuracy, and thoroughness. Members of the 
organization can now either submit valuable pieces of information to CALL for analysis 
and input into the "corporate memory" or search the database for information to help 
train or prepare their units for combat. The capabilities of this information technology 
infrastructure include: scanning documents directly into the database, establishing a 
communication link between deployed Combined Arms Assessment Teams and analysts 
1
 Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, Hope is Not A Method, Random House, 1996, pg. 
208. 
at Fort Leavenworth, and distributing lessons learned via e-mail, CD-ROM, and web 
page links. 
As today's Army moves further into the Information Age and its mission evolves 
into a CONUS-based, Force Projection Army with diverse mission requirements, the 
ability to collect and disseminate lessons learned has never been more important. Units 
must be able to use the lessons of those soldiers that have preceded them to maximize 
force multipliers, execute missions right the first time, and save lives. The objective of 
this research is to analyze the efficiency of the IT infrastructure to collect and disseminate 
lessons learned to the force and the impact that it has had on CALL effectiveness as an 
organization. It will address not only possible improvements to the infrastructure, but 
also to the organization as a whole. 
B.        RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this thesis is: How has the implementation of 
Information Technology increased the organizational effectiveness of CALL in collecting 
and distributing lessons learned to the total army? The subsidiary research questions are 
as follows: 
1. What changes in the lessons learned collection process have come about as a 
result of the implementation of Information Technology? 
2. How effective is the information categorized within the CALL DB for access 
by users throughout the service? 
3. What impact did the implementation of IT have on the organizational size and 
structure? 
4. What changes in skills qualifications of personnel have resulted from the 
changes? 
5. Does the organization have an existing culture that must be overturned to 
successfully implement change? 
6. What   changes   within   the   organization   would   further   improve   the 
organization's effectiveness to capture and disseminate lessons? 
C.        SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this case study is limited to the period from the inception of the 
Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) in 1985 through the present day. Utilizing 
this historical time reference, the study analyzes the significant events affecting CALL 
and the actions and decisions taken by the organizational director and deputy director to 
enable the transformation of the lessons learned process from a paper and pencil system 
to one reliant on information technology. 
The methodology used in this thesis is a historical case analysis of the Center for 
Army Lessons Learned. To conduct this case analysis the author conducted personnel 
interviews with the organization's deputy director, branch chiefs, senior analysts, and 
Combined Arms Assessment Team members to record their impressions on the 
organization and its processes He also conducted a search of the CALL Database to 
gather information of previous lessons learned collection processes, organizational 
structures, and other data relating to the transformation of CALL. The modeling software 
Extend was used to construct a simulation of the organization's lesson learned collection 
process and how a typical user might gain access to information from the organization. 
4 
The data from both the pre- and post-implementation simulations were then used as a 
comparison of the efficiency of the organization. A survey of mid career company grade 
officers is conducted to determine the depth and breath of their knowledge of the various 
services that CALL provides. This survey is used to establish CALL'S effectiveness in 
disseminating lessons learned to this key customer group. 
D.        ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I. Introduction: Identifies the focus and purpose of the thesis as well 
as the primary and subsidiary research questions. 
Chapter II. Background of the Army Lessons Learned Process: Provides the 
reader with the history of the Army's Lesson Learned Process from its initial use during 
World War II through the formation of CALL and its subsequent transformation to 
support the Information Age Army of today. 
Chapter in. CALL Organizational Structure: Provides the reader with a 
detailed explanation of the organization's stakeholders, pre-IT organizational structure, 
and current organizational structure of CALL 
Chapter IV. CALL Lesson Learned Methodology: Provides a detailed 
explanation of the process, which CALL uses to capture and disseminate lessons learned 
to the total army. 
Chapter V. Information Technology at CALL: Identifies the information 
technology that is in place to assist CALL in the lesson learned process. 
Chapter VI. Analysis of CALL'S Organizational Design: Provides an abridged 
explanation of major components of the Galbraith Star Model for Organizational Design 
and analyzes the significant changes to the organization that occurred as a result of the 
implementation of information technology using the Galbraith Star Model. 
Chapter VII. Conclusions and Recommendations: Summarizes the findings of 
the research and answers the research questions. 
E.        BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study provides the necessary information to evaluate the effect the 
incorporation of technology is likely to have on an organization. It serves as an example 
for other DoD organizations seeking to implement an IT infrastructure to improve their 
organization's effectiveness. 
II.      BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY LESSONS LEARNED 
PROCESS 
"I am tempted to say that whatever doctrine the armed forces are 
working on now, they have it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it 
does not matter. What does matter is their ability to get it right quickly 
when the need to use it arrives."2 
British Historian Sir Michael Howard 
A.        ORIGINS OF LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS 
As early as World War II, the Army attempted to increase its organizational 
learning by creating mechanisms for sharing and adopting lessons from the battlefield in 
an effort to save lives. In World War II, General Marshall directed his chief of military 
history to collect what was being learned by soldiers in the Pacific and European Theater 
and to provide these lessons to the training base of new recruits back in the United States. 
Although the process that General Marshall adopted did not survive the war, the idea of 
using "lessons learned" would subsequently be revived during both the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars.3 Because of the informality of the collection, analysis, and dissemination 
process of the era, the impact and significance of the lessons learned process could not be 
measured, but the idea behind it would remain a valuable part of the Army's institutional 
background. 
2
 Ibid. pg. 190. 
3
 Ibid. pg. 204. 
B.        ADOPTION OF THE AFTER ACTION REVIEW 
Based on the value added by the previous wartime lessons learned collection 
processes, the Army sought a new system to improve its performance and organizational 
learning during times of relative peace. By the mid 1970's, the Army's mechanism for 
collecting and disseminating lessons consisted of the After Action Review (AAR). The 
AAR was developed under the guidance of Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) 
Commander General William E. DuPuy. It was designed to be a structured method to 
facilitate learning by individuals or small units from the complex experiences that result 
from their tactical operations or training.4 The AAR had three fundamental purposes: 
learning, improving, and doing it better the next time. The AAR process was to take 
place after every training event and would follow a standard structured format. The 
AAR would address three questions: 
• What happened? 
• Why did it happen? 
• What should we do about it? 
The structure of the AAR was formally outlined in the Army Training Circular 25-20, A 
Leader's Guide to After Action Reviews. Fifty percent of the total available time was 
allocated to answering the first two questions and the remaining time to answer the final 
question. 
The participants of the exercise would sit down with an Observer Controller 
(OC) who monitored the unit's performance throughout the exercise and lead  a 
4
 Ibid. pg. 190. 
discussion on the events that had transpired. Using the unit's intended plan and doctrine 
as the base of reference, the group would talk about the events that unfolded in an effort 
to improve unit proficiency. They were not to focus on individual performance, position, 
or rank of the participants. The OC was designated to foster a non-threatening 
environment in which all members of the organization were highly encouraged to 
participate no matter what their rank or experience level. The AAR was not intended to 
fix blame, but to truthfully discover why things happened the way they did and to identify 
areas for sustainment or improvement. This structured, open discussion process not only 
promoted learning, but facilitates honest feedback, organizational member buy-in, and 
trust in the unit. At the tactical level, the AAR provided a dynamic link between 
executing a task to standard and developing TTPs. Soldiers quickly understood when 
they did not perform a task to standard and what actions should be modified to improve 
proficiency. Leaders could then use the information to assess performance and retrain 
units as necessary. 
Within 10 years of its intimation, the AAR process had become embedded into 
the Army's culture because of its focus on improvement without fixing or allaying 
blame.5 Its value had been accepted, and its use spread to activities other than training. 
Over time the Army became increasingly reliant on the use of the AAR to assess its 
combat unit capabilities and preparedness for combat. 
5
 Ibid. pg. 192. 
C.        ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER 
Since 1979, the Army had repeatedly petitioned the U.S. Congress to permit the 
creation of a training center that would allow it to "isolate and resolve recurring problems 
that have an Army-wide impact."6   In April of 1979 TRADOC published the NTC 
Development Plan, which stated that a key aspect would be its impact on developing 
lessons learned for the force and assessing training, doctrine, and equipment requirements 
for the Army.     In 1981, the Army established the NTC at Fort Irwin, California.  The 
NTC was to offer individual soldiers and units a training environment that closely 
paralleled that of actual combat; this provided an opportunity that was not currently 
available at home stations.7   The training would consist of force-on-force engagements 
against an Opposing Force (OPFOR).8 The training center used objective data recorders 
such as audio from radio transmissions, video from cameras located throughout the battle 
space, and digital input from the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System for real 
time assessment of personnel and vehicle casualties to provide feedback to units.   In 
6
 Army Training: National Training Center's Potential Has Not Been Realized 
GAO/NSIAD 86-130, 23 July 1986, pg. 14. 
7
 Ibid. pg8. 
8
 The OPFOR, consisting of about 1500 personnel, is designed to replicate a 
Soviet motorized rifle regiment. Soviet style tactics and U.S. vehicles modified to look 
like soviet vehicles are used during force-on-forces simulated engagements. The NTC 
requires units to conduct training in eight different battle scenarios, which include 
offensive and defensive operations in day and night. The scenarios are changed for each 
training rotation so that NTC presents a different challenge to soldiers who have been to 
NTC previously. 
10 
addition, a qualitative assessment of unit performance was provided by 126 OCs who 
watched and recorded events and provided feedback to small units in the form of AARs. 
By the mid 1980's, the Army extended the success they had at the NTC by 
developing three additional major combat training centers. The CMTC at Hohenfels, 
Germany is where United States Army Europe (USAREUR) units train heavy 
mechanized infantry and armored brigades in a fashion similar to the NTC. JRTC at Fort 
Polk, Louisiana is used by light forces for Low/Mid-Intensity Conflict, and BCTP at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas is designed to provide command and control training for division 
and higher battle staffs.9 As the Army's forces trained at these centers and were 
evaluated on their ability to conduct their wartime missions, senior leadership began to 
receive feedback that units were repeating many of the same mistakes during maneuver 
exercises. 
A Government Accounting Office study of the effectiveness of the NTC in 1986 
discovered that lists of training trends compiled in March 1982 and in 1985 "showed 
many of the same problem areas."10 Some of these recurring mistakes could have had 
serious consequences on a real battlefield; these included fratricide incidents and 
operational inabilities in a Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) environment. Most of 
the mistakes were identified and corrected using the current AAR system in specific 
units, and these would not be repeated during the ongoing rotation. However, the same 
corrections had to be made when the next unit arrived at the training center. This pattern 
9
 Army Training:  Prioritizing and Follow up on Lessons Learned  Should 
Minimize Recurring Weaknesses, GAO/NSIAD 93-231, 16 September 1993, pg. 1. 
10
 Ibid. Pg.21. 
11 
depicted  a  system  that  promoted  individual  learning but  little  organizational  or 
institutional learning. 
GAO concluded that the fundamental reason behind the failure to develop Army- 
wide lessons learned was that the primary emphasis was directed towards the training 
aspects of the NTC and providing units with immediate feedback. In addition, according 
to Army officials, the service still had not determined what analysis or data were required 
to develop lessons learned. The Army schools that were responsible for training and 
doctrine development had not been required to define the data necessary to fully evaluate 
training or doctrine effectiveness.11 Overall, the GAO concluded that the lack of a 
systematic method to collect, process, and distribute lessons learned was causing the 
NTC not to fulfill a major portion of its intent. 
To make the transition from an individual learning process to an organizational 
learning process, the Army Chief of Staff directed TRADOC to develop a systematic way 
to obtain information from the NTC exercises. In December 1985, TRADOC assigned 
this mission to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth. 
D.   THE CREATION OF CALL 
Although the use of the AAR and the NTC had become the cornerstones for the 
Army's effort to improve its ability to collect lessons learned, it had a fundamental flaw. 
Their design was to create learning at the small unit level; they could not, on their own, 
transfer these lessons across the entire organization. The realization of this shortcoming 
11
 GAO/NSIAD 86-130, pg. 15. 
12 
by senior Army leaders, especially in the aftermath of Operation Urgent Fury, resulted in 
the desire to develop a mechanism to permit sharing lessons across the entire Army. This 
new mechanism would be achieved through the creation of the Center For Army Lessons 
Learned (CALL) in late 1985. CALL would be tasked with collecting and consolidating 
the subjective assessments from the NTC and major exercises into one central location. 
They would analyze them to identify trends, identify training problems and their causes, 
prioritize recurring problems, develop or assign proponents to develop solutions to 
them.12 
CALL developed the Lesson Learned Process to achieve these tasks. The process 
included data collection using a variety of sources, including AARs, audio and video 
transmissions, and the evaluations of observers at the training centers. This process 
relied heavily on creating a standardized data/observation collection format that was used 
during an NTC rotation or major training exercises. CALL required any observation to 
follow a new standard trip report format. They also focused the attention of observers on 
selective issues that CALL was attempting to analyze. Before this standardization, the 
Army schools had been sending Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to the NTC to observe 
exercises and evaluate the training rather than requiring them -to document specific 
observations. In addition, the evaluation reports had been so general and unstructured 
that they provided little value or usefulness. Once data was collected, CALL 
consolidated them and conducted analyses for trends and deficiencies. It then published 
the results of its analyses in quarterly bulletins and newsletters that were sent to each of 
12
 Ibid. pg. 22. 
13 
the TRADOC schools and tactical organizations throughout the Army. The TRADOC 
schools and tactical organizations were ultimately responsible for using CALL'S input to 
modify training or doctrine.13 
By 1989, the Army had quickly recognized the need to expand the lessons learned 
process to function in the event of combat operations. To meet this expanded role, CALL 
developed the Wartime Lessons Learned Program (WALLP). WALLP was later 
synthesized with the NTC and major exercise collection process in AR 11-33, Army 
Lessons Learned Program: System Development and Application, to establish a system 
for collecting and analyzing all field data and disseminating and archiving lessons from 
actual Army operations and training events. CALL conducted its first combat operation 
collection effort in December 1989, when Operation Just Cause began in Panama.14 The 
system outlined by AR 11-33 consisted of a 6 phase process: Plan, Collect, Analyze, 
Publish, Distribute, and Archive with a stated goal of "getting the information into the 
hands of soldiers and units to help them perform their mission right the first time."15 
When the GAO conducted a follow-up assessment of the effectiveness of CALL 
in 1993, they found that "Despite the lessons learned program, Army units are still 
repeating the same mistakes during maneuver exercises at the combat training centers."16 
The underlying problem of recurring mistakes was found to be two fold. First, TRADOC 
13
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and CALL, in particular, did not assign priorities to the lessons learned when it provided 
them to the schools. The lessons were provided to the school as information to use as 
they wished. By not tracking the extent to which the schools modified their training or 
doctrine to incorporate the lessons learned, TRADOC was not enforcing one of the key 
components of organizational learning. 
Underscoring the importance that TRADOC's emphasis had on fostering 
organizational learning, the GAO highlighted a case where CALL had continued to 
identify fratricide-related problems recurring at the NTC. In 1989, CALL issued a plan 
to correct these deficiencies in six key areas; they assigned specific actions and 
responsibilities to be taken by the various schools and tactical organizations. By the 
onset of Operation Desert Shield, most of the responsible organizations either did not 
carry out the specified actions or could not document what actions they had taken. As a 
result of the numerous incidents of fratricide that resulted during Operation Desert Storm, 
renewed interest in these areas arose, and the Combined Arms Command issued a new 
plan to incorporate all of the key areas addressed in the original 1989 plan, plus two 
additional areas. This time, with TRADOC's pressure, the Army more aggressively 
implemented the plan. As a result, data from the mid 1990's shows a vast decrease in 
fratricide-related problems at the NTC. 
The second key problem that contributed to CALL'S ineffectiveness was, as 
General Sullivan noted, "the data from the training centers and actual operations 
overwhelmed our pencil-and-paper system." 17   CALL'S analysts were trying to take 
17
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thousands of AARs, audio and video data, and trip reports and condense them into its 
bulletins. In the process, although they were providing insights into how to overcome 
deficiencies, they also were aggregating data to such a high level that it tended not to be 
useful.18 Aside from this problem, the slowness of the manual lessons learned process 
often prevented timely information flow to the schools or field, and it limited the ability 
of units to request information on specific problems outside of those addressed by the 
standard CALL bulletins. In an effort to overcome the shortfalls in meeting the original 
goal of getting the information into the hands of soldiers in a timely manner, CALL 
sought to leverage the use of information technology. 
E. CALL'S INCORPORATION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
From the earliest moments of the information technology revolution, CALL has 
sought ways to increase its ability to meet its primary goal. Shortly after Operation 
Desert Shield, CALL undertook a test bed program to automate the archiving phase of 
the lessons learned process. With the support of the TRADOC Commander, CALL 
established the Automated Historical Archives System (AHAS) to electronically archive 
lessons learned into a vast database. This system not only would increase the ability to 
access information, but also assist in the Army-wide dissemination of numerous historical 
and new lessons learned documents from the Gulf War. By early 1993, this system was in 




The success of this system was evident during the 10 Mountain Division's (10 
MD) deployment to Haiti in September 1994. Once the unit was alerted to prepare to 
deploy, CALL was able to search its database and create a tailored soldier's handbook for 
operating in that environment. Information included preventive medicine for the tropics, 
crowd control techniques, tips for dealing with local officials, and tactics and small unit 
procedures for Urban Operations. These handbooks were produced quickly and sent to 
the units use during pre-deployment training at home station. This effort enabled the 
Army to significantly increase the effectiveness of the division once in theater. As a 
comparison, when this same unit deployed to Somalia just two years earlier, CALL was 
unable to provide any real value added prior to the deployment. 
CALL also sent collection teams to Haiti to capture the knowledge being gained 
everyday by soldiers of the 10th MD while deployed. This knowledge was then 
transferred to troops from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (Light) and 25th Infantry Division 
(25th ID) through updated handbooks based on the current situation in Haiti, feedback 
from the 10th Mountain Divisions soldiers, and updated Rules of Engagement. CALL'S 
lessons also were incorporated into the creation of a training environment that simulated 
Haiti-like conditions at the JRTC to prepare follow on forces prior to their rotation into 
the country. 19 In fact of the 26 scenarios CALL developed for the 25th ID to use during 
their pre-deployment training, 23 were actually faced by units of the command during 
their 6 months in Haiti. One soldier from the 25th ID responded to a reporter from CNN 
19
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that a mission had been so successful and smooth, "Because I have already executed this 
mission 20 times before [actually getting here]."20 
CALL'S success in assisting the improved operational performance of units 
deployed to Haiti resulted in the CAC Commander's expansion of the test program to 
incorporate the integration of Information Technology throughout the lessons learned 
process. The expansion of automation included the use of databases, computers, servers, 
e-mail, FTP, and other on-line technologies to assist in the reporting and dissemination 
of lessons learned to the total Army. The goal of CALL was to refocus to "ensure the 
Army receives timely and relevant feedback required to achieve victory in the 
Information Age." 21 
SUMMARY 
Since the late 1940's, the Army has realized the importance of having a 
mechanism to facilitate the transfer of lessons learned on the battlefield to its training 
base in an effort to save lives. In 1985, the Army created the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned to oversee this function. CALL was tasked as the organization responsible for 
collecting observations, transferring them into relevant lessons, and then disseminating 
them to the force. By the mid 1990's, CALL'S existing lessons learned process had been 
overwhelmed with the amount of data that it was collecting; it therefore sought to 
20
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leverage Information Technology as a possible solution. The automation of the 
collection process proved invaluable in preparing forces for Operation Restore Hope and 
soon was developed as a means to support all of the organization's key functions. 
19 
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III.    CALL'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
"The Army has perfected a remarkably efficient process for 
correcting its mistakes and sustaining its successes."22 
A.        CALL'S MISSION AND KEY FUNCTIONS 
Almost since CALL'S inception in 1985, it has maintained the same primary 
mission: to collect, analyze, and disseminate timely and relevant lessons learned, tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs), research material and security assessments to Army 
units around the world.23 To satisfy this mission it must conduct the following key 
functions: collect relevant observations, analyze observations and develop lessons 
learned, disseminate lessons in a timely manner, act as an agent for change, maintain a 
historical file of all lessons learned and AARs, and recommend changes to doctrine, 
training, organization, material, and leadership (DTOML).24 By fulfilling these core 
functions, CALL not only could improve individual learning and performance, but more 
importantly serve as the mechanism for developing organizational learning in the Army. 
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B. ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
One of the key aspects that effect the performance of an organization is the 
environment in which it operates. The environment comprises elements outside the 
organization, including stakeholders, that may influence the ability to accomplish key 
goals. These elements can affect the organization by making demands or placing 
constraints on it.25 The CALL'S environment includes the following key stakeholders: 
FORSCOM, TRADOC, CAC, and the United States Congress/GAO. (Figure 1) 
Army Lessons Learned Structure 
Figure 1. Army Lessons Learned Structure 
1. United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) 
FORSCOM, whose mission is to train, mobilize, deploy, and sustain combat 
ready forces capable of operating in a joint and combined environment, is the warfighting 
arm of the Army. Through its responsibility to train over 760,000 active and reserve 
soldiers for combat, FORSCOM is the main user of the services that CALL provides. 
Not only is it CALL's biggest client, but it also is the source of its data. 
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FORSCOM is also responsible for the operational control of the Combat 
Training Centers. It is through the observation of FORSCOM units at the Combat 
Training Centers, major training exercises, and during actual operations that CALL is 
able to gather lesson learned. FORSCOM's influence on CALL is its ability to identify 
which exercises or operations require Combined Arms Assessment Teams (CAAT) and 
specify collection requirements on an issue. This shapes the scope of CALL's collection 
effort, which in turn effects the products that are produced for the Army.26 
2. United States Army Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
TRADOC is charged with the major Army missions of individual training and 
combat development. This vast task places "the development of the Army's tactical 
organizations, weapons, equipment, doctrine, and the training of soldiers in that doctrine, 
in one command."27 Individual training, for both officers and enlisted soldiers, is 
conducted through the military education system, which consist of 18 TRADOC 
monitored military specialty schools located throughout the United States. The 
responsibility for doctrine development is divided between the levels of TRADOC's 
hierarchy. TRADOC headquarters, located at Fort Meyer, Virginia, writes strategic level 
doctrine; Combined Arms Center, located at Fort Leavenworth, writes Corps and 
Division level doctrine; proponent school headquarters write branch specific Field 
Manuals. 
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TRADOC's requirement to develop doctrine has a significant impact on CALL'S 
ability to conduct their mission. When CALL identifies lessons learned that are linked to 
problems in individual training or doctrine, it provides that input to TRADOC for action 
by the proponent organization.     TRADOC then holds the school accountable for 
correcting   these   deficiencies   by   incorporating   them   into   training   or   doctrine 
modifications. As TRADOC prepares the Army for the future, through the development 
of new doctrine, such as Force XXI or the Army After Next, they use the collection and 
analysis functions of CALL to provide feedback about the feasibility of the doctrine. 
3.   United States Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) 
The mission of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) is to educate officers in the art 
of command and staff functions of the combined arms at the tactical level and to educate 
officers in the operational art of war.28    CAC has a training development function for 
battle command staff and experimenting with concepts, methods, procedures and means 
of battle command.   CAC is one of the proponent organizations under the control of 
TRADOC and has the tasks of writing the doctrine for war fighting at the division and 
corps levels.    CAC is also the higher headquarters for CALL within the TRADOC 
organizational hierarchy. 
When CALL identifies lessons learned that are linked to problems at the tactical 
doctrine level, it provides that input to CAC for correcting these deficiencies by 
incorporating them into training or doctrine modifications. Since CAC also is 




scope of CALL'S lessons learned process by dictating what issues require collection and 
analysis. 
4.   The Department of the Army (DA) 
Through its tasking authority, the Department of the Army provides the impetus 
for CALL to initiate its active collection operations in support of actual operations or 
major  training  exercises.     This  key  power  grants   CALL  two  important  items: 
authorization and funding.   First, the Department of the Army will generate a support 
tasking to furnish CALL with not only the CAAT Team Chief, but official authorization 
to request CAAT team members from the relevant TRADOC proponent schools.   This 
formal tasking is a binding requirement to TRADOC to temporarily assign qualified 
personnel to CALL to assist the upcoming collection mission.    Secondly, and most 
importantly, once a formal tasking comes from DA, it also appropriates the budgetary 
funds that will be used by CALL in support of the collection effort. Without the granting 
of these additional funds, CALL does not have an operating budget to actively collect 
data.   Because of the DA's power to control CALL'S ability to generate and fund its 
collection efforts, it has enormous impact on what events and issues CALL undertakes. 
This allows the DA to shape the corporate learning mechanism to focus on issues that it 
sees most important. 
5. U.S. Congress/General Accounting Office (GAO) 
Since the U.S. Congress is responsible for appropriating funds to all DoD 
programs, it has a significant impact on CALL'S personnel, equipment, and collection 
effort. Congress employs the GAO to: examine the use of public funds, evaluate federal 
programs and activities, and provide assistance with oversight, policy, and funding 
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decisions.29    As a result, GAO works to continuously improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Department of the Army through program reviews. 
It is in this context that the GAO has sought to assess the overall impact that the 
CALL Lessons Learned Process has had on the Army. Once an evaluation is made, the 
GAO furnishes a report to the Executive or Legislative Branch member that has 
requested the service. They can then use this report to justify funding, expand CALL's 
mission, or make other determinations as appropriate. 
The geopolitical realities that now face the United States Army also are critical to 
understanding CALL's environment. When CALL was founded in the mid 80's, the 
Army was structured both organizationally and doctrinally to counter the threat posed by 
the Soviet Union. The Army was expected to be prepared to fight a high intensity 
conflict in the European or Korean theaters against a known enemy using understood and 
well documented tactics. The task of CALL was finding trends in training deficiencies 
and creating tactical level solutions. Time was not a factor in the development and 
dissemination of these solutions. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union; new geopolitical realities exist. The Army 
has to counter many different threats along the conflict continuum including 
peacekeeping operations, mid-intensity conflicts, humanitarian relief, terrorism and 
cyberterrorism. Speed in the collection and dissemination of lessons learned to the total 
Army is now paramount. In addition to rapidly collecting and disseminating lessons 
learned, CALL must tailor training packages to FORSCOM prior to the deployment of 
29 www.gao.gov 
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forces and to TRADOC for necessary adjustments to strategic and tactical level doctrine 
to counter this extensive expansion of threats. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
1.   1990 Functional Configuration 
From its inception in the mid-1980's, CALL has undergone many organizational 
changes. Initially CALL was developed to capture lessons learned from the Combat 
Training Centers. By 1989 senior Army leadership realized that CALL also should 
support on going combat operations to identify lessons being learned by deployed 
lighting forces. As a result of this expansion of its mission, CALL was reorganized by 
functionality, in 1990. CALL's basic organizational structure consisted of four major 
divisions: Collections, Analysis, Processing, and Dissemination.30 Additionally, an 
Operations cell at Fort Leavenworth ran the day to day operations of CALL, while small 
observation divisions at each of the CTCs supported units conducting training. 
The Operations cell consisted of the director, deputy director, and two secretaries. 
They were responsible for distribution, budgeting, tasking and tracking ongoing 
collection efforts, as well as administrative and logistical support of the organization. 
The Collections division consisted of two sections. The Combined Arms Assessment 
Teams collected observations from on going major exercises and actual operations, and 
the Wartime Lessons Learned Program (WALLP) collected after-the-fact interviews on 
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.   Because of senior Army leaderships desire to 
30
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document all aspects of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, CALL'S WALLUP section's 
authorization was increased an additional 40 personnel to assist in this effort. The 
Analyst division consisted of 9 civilian analysts who were charged with transforming the 
observations from the Collection division into lessons learned. Those observations that 
were deemed relevant by the analyst were identified and grouped under a particular 
Battlefield Operating System (BOS) and were provided as input to future products and 
publications. The Processing division was accountable for the production of all initial 
impression reports, final reports, newsletters, articles, training vignettes, handbooks, and 
exportable training packages. The Dissemination division had the primary responsibility 
to provide all CALL products to evaluated units, the organizational stakeholders, and the 
historical archives. 
2. 1993 Reorganization To Divisional/Product Configuration 
In 1993, responding to the increasing demand on the Army, CALL underwent 
another reorganization. The reasons for this were threefold. Firstly, to increase 
effectiveness through analysis. Secondly, to adjust the organization to meet the steadily 
increasing missions without an increase in personnel. Lastly, to focus on the 
development and implementation of automated data systems. CALL was separated into 
three major divisions: Collection, Analysis, and Information Systems (Figure 2). This 
would transform the organization from a functional organization to a product 
organization. The reorganization upgraded each division chief to Lieutenant Colonel and 
allowed each a certain independence in collecting, analyzing, processing, and publishing 
materials  in their respective  orientation  to  a product  orientation.     This  type of 
28 
departmentalization creates self-contained divisions, each of which is responsible for 
every aspect of a certain product.31 
CALL Organizational Chart 
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Figure 2. CALL Organizational Chart 1993-1996 
The functions of the Operations and Administration cell remained relatively 
unchanged, and its personnel manning remained at four. The Collection division 
maintained its focus on supporting CAATs, WALLP, and Support to Exercise (STE) 
requirements to include: Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Support Hope in 
Uganda, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and 3rd Army's Bright Star exercise. In 
addition to these roles, the Collection division also assumed a pivotal role in the 
Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM), a series of simulations and exercises by the Army to 
anticipate and adapt its our changing environment. Force XXI doctrine resulted from 
these exercises and was used to replace the outdate Air Land Battle Doctrine. Although it 
expanded its collection effort and would also conduct some preliminary analysis, the 
Collection division was reduced as a result of the completion of the Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm collection effort to a manning of 10 to 12 officers and enlisted soldiers. 
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The Analysis and Publication division's four civilians were to serve as researchers 
and archivist for the organization. The newly created Information Systems division was 
tasked with the development, testing, and implementation of automated data systems. 
This function was seen as paramount to ensuring CALL'S future success and resulted in 
"the recruitment of 25% of CALL'S officer strength to upgrade and test information 
systems." 32 They were charged with developing and maintaining the CALL database 
(CALL DB), providing the automation equipment infrastructure to include computers for 
CAATs, and implementing the Army Lessons Learned Management Information System 
(ALLMIS). After the initial surge of personnel to assist CALL leverage the emergence 
of information systems, the division's manning was reduced to three officers to maintain 
the equipment and continue to seek advances in information technology. 
The last significant change in this reorganization came in the latter half of 1994 
when the CTC Division was added. Its mission was to supervise the Focused Rotation 
Program at the CTCs, collect lessons from the BCTP Warfighter exercises, and publish 
take home packets and trend newsletters for the units of FORSCOM. This effort was 
manned with 8-12 officers, enlisted soldiers and civilians, located at Fort Leavenworth 
and at each CTC. 
3. 1996 Reorganization to Support the Information Age 
In March 1996, CAC fused the Army Knowledge Network (AKN) and CALL in 
an integrated effort to provide timely and relevant lessons learned to the entire force. 
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AKN had been developed in the early 1990s as a system of linked and cross-referenced 
databases constituting a complete collection of military, political, social, and 
economic information pertinent to military operations.33 Each activity was expected to 
complement and strengthen the other. CALL had long achieved excellence in analyzing 
and providing relevant lessons learned, and AKN had a strong reputation for its electronic 
archiving and rapid distribution of documents. Along with the combination of AKN and 
CALL, the implementation of web enabled solutions was expected to facilitate CALL's 
communications with units across the Army. This merger would solve a longstanding 
CALL problem of disseminating vital information throughout the Army. The 
reorganization initially reduced the number of divisions to three: Lessons Learned, 
Information Systems, and Research. Each division focused on the specific services that 
CALL provided. However, in 1998, CALL was expanded to also incorporate the Army's 
University After Next (UAN) (Figure 3). 
The Lessons Learned Division (LLD) consists of two sections: Actual Operations 
(AO) and the Combat Training Center (CTC) Branch. The LLD's mission is to gather 
and analyze observations and produce a variety of lessons learned literature for the entire 
Army. They have a total of 28 military and civilian personnel to assist in this function. 
The AO Branch is assigned the task of collecting observations from contingency 
operations and training exercises through the use of CAAT teams. CAATs are task- 
organized teams of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) representing each BOS normally from 
TRADOC Schools and Centers.   These teams are lead by a TRADOC-provided Team 
33
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Chief external to CALL. If sufficient time is available, they also host a Collection 
Workshop for CAAT personnel on the collection plan and lessons learned methodology. 
The AO Branch also furnishes an operation officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) 
to assist the CAAT Team Chief with operation support issues and the CALL collection 
methodology. The AO Branch has nine officers and NCOs to assist in this function as 
required.34 Along with the OPSO/OPSNCO, CALL also assigns a civilian analyst to 
support each CAAT collection effort. The three civilian analysts not only provide 
feedback on the quality of the observations, but also insure that the collection effort is 
addressing its stated targets. 
CALL Organizational Chart 
Operation & 
Administration 





(ISD) Alter Next (CAN) 
Actual Operations Combo! Training 
Branch Center Branch 
Information ... , ,. 
Technology ' 
Special 
WTC     1    |   JRTC    j |   CMTC   |    I   8CTF 
Figure 3. Present CALL Organizational Chart 
The CTC Branch's mission is to capture lessons learned and TTP derived from 
observation at the CTCs for dissemination to the Total Army. Unlike the AO Branch, 
members of this section conduct both active and passive collection while units are 
training at the four CTCs.    They also are responsible for conducting analysis of 
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performance trends to assist units in focusing their training at home stations. CTC 
Branch has a total of 12 military and civilian analyst located at each of the training 
centers and Fort Leavenworth, and the CTC also prepares products to assess units' 
abilities to execute their wartime missions.35 
The Research Division (RD) is composed of 7-14 archivists, historians, record 
managers, librarians, and security specialists. RD is responsible for not only the lessons 
learned that are produced by the LLD, but also for archiving all Operations Orders 
(OPORDs), AARs, and army tactical level related articles from professional magazines. 
They provide the records of all information stored by CALL that are available to 
authorized personnel throughout the Army. It is this division that is responsible for 
inputting all classified and unclassified data into the CALL DB for use via the World 
Wide Web using the CALL Gateway or the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(SIPRNet). The RD processes data in two ways. Paper data is scanned into computers in 
a digital format and then uploaded to the CALL DB. Electronic documents are directly 
uploaded by archive technicians. All documents are stored by appropriate classification 
in electronic filerooms based on archival standards. 
The Information System Division (ISD) is the automation equipment support 
infrastructure branch. They facilitate the collection effort by the effective use of 
emerging telecommunication and computer technologies. ISD renders support to the 
collection and analysis process as well as the publication and dissemination process. The 




Observation Management System (CALLCOMS). This software allows the CAAT to 
formulate a collection plan and categorize observations. CALLCOMS robust search, 
sort, and filter capabilities assist analysts and trend identifications. The key to CAAT's 
success is the use of the Internet. CAATs now have the ability to use File Transfer 
Protocol (FTP) to transmit observations stored in CALLCOMS back to CALL for storage 
or analysis by the LLD Branch while still deployed. They can also use this 
communication link to send messages back to CALL twenty-four hours a day when 
assistance is needed. They no longer have to worry about waiting for business hours to 
pass information because messages are forwarded to the intended recipient and waiting 
for them once they arrive at work. 
Automation also aids the production and distribution of products by CALL. 
CALL'S ISD supports four main methods for the electronic distribution of products: E- 
Mail, postings of current products on the CALL Web homepage, storage in the CALL 
DB, and storage in the CALLCOMS DB. This division is currently manned with six 
civilians located at CALL and six civilians assigned to the Fort Leavenworth Department 
of Information Management (DOEVI). 
The newest division of CALL, UAN is a distributed organization designed to 
meet the emerging knowledge needs of the Army After Next. It consists of three 
components: Distributed Laboratory, Distributed Library, and Distributed University. 
These components provide the capability for enterprise-wide knowledge and learning 
management by integrating and synchronizing best practices and technologies from 
public, academic, private, and military sectors. The UAN integrates new technologies 
and methods to create a common learning environment to meet the future requirements of 
34 
soldiers, leaders, and units. It is tasked with developing technologies that will serve as 
the cornerstone of the theory of "Reachback". Reachback allows soldiers and leaders to 
gain real-time tailored knowledge from SME located throughout the world for 
contingency or information needs that may arise.36 
The Distributed Laboratory will identify methods for transferring knowledge and 
information between deployed units and resource centers located throughout the world. 
The Distributed Library will serve as a single point of access for soldiers and leaders to a 
vast knowledge repository. Not only Army and DoD information systems will be linked, 
but also physical and virtual public libraries. It will address general questions that may 
arise using multiple integrated formats to include video, audio, imagery, or text. The 
Distributed University will provide mentorship to the user to answer very specific 
issues.37 This will be done using a virtual staff or SMEs distributed at TRADOC schools 
or other knowledge centers. UAN's nine civilians will identify information technology 
solutions for training, learning, and educating the Army in the future to leverage 
knowledge into a combat multiplier. 
D.        SUMMARY 
Although its mission to collect, analyze, and disseminate timely and relevant 
lessons learned, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), remains virtually unchanged 
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since its inception CALL has undergone numerous structural changes. The changes 
from a Functional to a Product Orientation have been in an effort to increase the 
organization efficiency and to assist the assimilation of smaller organization into CALL. 
The present focus of CALL remains to continue to provide its services to its existing 
clients, while using the UAN to identify emerging technologies that can be used to 
support the knowledge requirements of the future force. 
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IV.    LESSONS LEARNED METHODOLOGY 
"The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military 
mind is to get an old one out."38 
A.   ROLE OF A LEARNING ORGANIZATION 
The Army's drive towards transforming itself to meet its mission has become 
increasingly important as the geopolitical instability of the post Cold War era continues. 
With a myriad of new threats and commitments that have emerged in the 1990's, the 
force has had to become more deployable, flexible, and responsive while simultaneously 
undergoing a reduction in personnel strength of nearly one third on its current manning. 
The challenge that faced the Army was how to take a highly bureaucratic organization 
that was very good at accepting gradual changes and make it operate effectively in an 
environment that could dictate an avalanche of required changes.39 To meet this 
challenge the Army, initially under General Sullivan's stewardship, sought to become 
what it defined as a learning organization. 
A learning organization is an "organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and 
transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behavior to reflect this new knowledge or 
insight."40 The key is not the idea that triggers the desired organizational improvement, 
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but rather the accompanying change in the way that the tasks get done. 4I Learning 
organizations must be skilled at five main activities that serve as the foundation for their 
success: systematic problem solving, experimentation with new approaches, learning 
from past experiences, learning from the experiences of others, and transferring 
knowledge quickly and efficiently throughout the organization. 42 
B. THE ARMY AS A LEARNING ORGANIZATION 
The Army has emplaced methods to enable it to perform each of the five activities 
necessary for it to qualify as a learning organization. Systematic problem solving is 
accomplished using various formal methods. The Army's most prevalent method for 
tactical decision making is based on the Boyd's OODA Loop. This process follows four 
distinct phases: Observe-Orient-Decide-Act. (Figure 4) 
Figure 4. Boyd's OODA Loop 
The output for each phase of the cycle serves as the input for the next phase and 
forms a continuous loop.   The Observe phase is an effort to determine exactly what is 
41




taking place in the decision makers environment and under what circumstances they must 
function. The Orient phase interprets the information gathered from the Observe phase, 
uses it identifies the overall objective, and formulates possible courses of actions. In the 
Decide phase, the decision-maker will determine how best to use all available resources 
to reach the stated objective. In the Act phase the decision-maker will execute the 
decision.43 
The Experimentation with New Approaches activity is broken down by the Army 
into two subgroups: ongoing and one-of-a-kind experimentation. The ongoing 
experiments are conducted at the service's battle labs that are located at each of the 
TRADOC proponent schools. These labs run extensive virtual and live tests/simulations 
to measure the impact of what changes to Doctrine, Training and Leader Development, 
Organization, Materiel, and Soldier (DTLOMS) will have on the force. One-of-a-kind 
experiments, such as the Advanced Warfighting Exercises (AWEs) are used to test the 
maturity of cutting edge technology and its impact on the effectiveness of current units. 
The results of both types of experiments provide a means to understand future 
warfighting requirements or current deficiencies. 
CALL serves as the focal point in helping the Army become a learning 
organization by responding to the last three activities. It addresses the Learning from 
Past Experiences activity in its effort to systematically collect, analyze, record and 
disseminate information throughout the organization. The open access to this 
information by all members of the organization prevents them from being "condemned to 
43
 Daniel H. Kim, "The Link between Individual and Organizational Learning, 
Sloan Management Review, Fall 1993, pg. 37-38. 
39 
repeating past mistakes."44 Since not all learning comes from self-analysis, CALL also 
gains valuable insight from the fourth activity, Learning from Others. As a member of 
such cooperative organizations as the ABCA Coalition Operations Lessons Learned 
Database, the Joint Services Lessons Learned program, and NATO Lessons Learned 
Program, it shares observations with the members of other military strategic alliances. 
These two-way exchanges are valuable because they allow the organization to gain either 
a new perspective on an issue or implement TTPs successfully used by Allies when the 
U.S. Army is operating in an environment which previously it has not been exposed. 
The last activity is the Transfer of Knowledge throughout the organization. For 
learning to have the maximum possible impact it must be transmitted not only as broadly 
as possible, but also quickly and efficiently. CALL spreads this knowledge thorugh a 
continuous series of pamphlets, bulletins, newsletters, briefings, and special after-action 
reports. These reports serve many purposes, to include: providing a checklist of do's and 
don'ts, summarizing trends, and furnishing input to modify training and doctrine. The 
effect of these reports is to develop shared mental models throughout all of the members 
of the organization. It is through individuals sharing and improving their inental models 
that true organizational learning occurs.45 The distribution -channel of CALL'S 
publications include all Army FORSCOM units down to the battalion level, TRADOC 
schools, the CTCs, major Reserve Component headquarters, other military services, and 
Allied nations through liaisons and attache offices.       CALL'S use of emerging 
44
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information technology solutions, such as web based access to its current publications 
and electronic copies sent via the Internet, assists in expediting the information out to its 
users. 
It is important to also track the efficiency of the spread of knowledge. This can 
be done by evaluating three overlapping stages of learning: cognitive, behavioral and 
performance improvements. Cognitive learning occurs when members are exposed to 
new ideas and begin to think differently. Behavioral learning is when members begin to 
internalize new ideas and alter their behavior. Performance improvement is when 
changes in behavior lead to measurable improvement in results.46 Because CALL does 
not have the authority to mandate implementation of its lessons, they are acted upon 
based on CALL'S reputation and their quality alone. 
The semi-regular products that result from CALL, such as the CTC Quarterly 
Bulletin, CTC Trends Bulletin, or Topic Newsletters generate cognitive learning. These 
products have near-term impact because they are focused on getting individual or unit 
level leaders to use these lessons prior to their incorporation into formal materials, for 
example field manuals. The Army uses its proponent schools and military education 
system to implement behavioral learning. The proponent schools use CALL's products 
to identify those lessons that will provide an added value to Army operations. These 
lessons then are incorporated into the long-term organizational memory through the 
modification of formal training programs and field manuals. As new ideas or TTPs are 
accepted, they are incorporated into the military education that all soldiers receive as they 
46
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periodically advance in rank. This education then serves as the basis for how they lead 
their units or perform missions in a tactical environment. Finally, the Army can track the 
progress as units rotate through the CTCs every 18 months. While at the CTC, each unit 
is evaluated using the latest doctrine, TTPs, and trend analysis to provide feedback to 
CALL showing whether the same mistakes are being repeated or the new ideas are being 
used to maximize unit performance. 
C. WHAT ARE ARMY LESSONS LEARNED? 
Before discussing the method that CALL uses to transform observations into 
lessons learned, it is important to understand the definition of a lesson learned. The 
Army defines a lesson learned as "validated knowledge and experience derived from 
observations and the historical study of military training, exercises, and combat 
operations."47 It is CALL'S responsibility to identify observations or data that will have 
a significant impact on/or require changes to one of the DTLOMS. Once this data is 
validated and bundled as new insight through use of the Lessons Learned System, it is 
codified as a lesson. These lessons are considered in term of focus, relevant, timely, and 
useful to affecting behavioral changes. CALL does not consider a lesson "learned" until 
it has resulted in behavioral change. Its ultimate purpose is not to build a knowledge base 
of data, but rather to actively engage in the process of changing a specified behavior that 
exists in the force. 
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 Center for Army Lessons Learned, CALL Handbook 97-13, United States 
Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, pg. 2. 
42 
D.   CALL'S LESSONS LEARNED SYSTEM 
The system employed by CALL to develop lessons learned is outlined in AR 11- 
33, Army Lessons Learned Program. This system establishes a methodology for 
collecting and analyzing field data and distributing, integrating, and archiving lessons 
from Army combat operations and training events. CALL breaks its various methods of 
gathering data into three classifications: Active, Passive, and Active-Passive. 
Active collection is done by the AO and CTC Branches when they send out 
CAAT Teams to observe and record data from ongoing training or operations. Passive 
collection is done via the website when members of the force either send observations or 
unit AARs into CALL for inclusion in the CALL DB. Active-Passive collection is done 
when CALL contacts a unit after the fact and conducts a formal interview or AAR with 
key members of the organization. It also will contact units that are redeploying from 
major training events and ask them to send a copy of all OPORDs, AARs, and ROEs to 
CALL for input into the database. No matter what the source of input of data, CALL will 
follow the same methodology to glean lessons learned from the data it is provided. This 
methodology consists of several basic components or stages: Mission Analysis and 
Planning, Deployment and Link-Up, Collection Operations, Analysis, Distribution and 
Archive. Only by the exercising of each of these components in a systematic process can 
CALL provide results in the form of lessons that assist soldiers and units to perform their 
missions right the first time. 
1.   Mission Analysis and Planning 
As with most military operations, effective and detailed planning appears to be 
central to CALL'S success in capturing lessons.   When CALL receives a request for 
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assistance or tasking to gather information and observations, mission analysis is initiated. 
Mission analysis is an attempt by key members of CALL and the requesting organization 
to determine what specific issues need to be address by the collection plan once it is 
formed. In the past, the data collection plans have taken a "vacuum cleaner approach." 
Observation teams were widely deployed and little attempt was made to define explicit 
learning objectives.4« The result, as earlier noted by General Sullivan, was the collection 
of a mass amount of data that overloaded the organization's capacity to turn it into useful 
information or lessons. Senior Army leaders at DA currently select what events have the 
highest potential for generating valuable lessons and outline the specific issues to be 
observed by the CAAT. This specific guidance to CALL and the CAATs has created a 
"telescope" of learning. This change, during mission analysis, in focusing the collection 
effort early has allowed the human analysts at CALL to no longer be the chokepoint of 
the Lessons Learned System. 
Once mission analysis is completed it serves as the basis for the composition of 
the collection team and the development of a detailed collection plan. The Combined 
Arms Assessment Team (CAAT) is composed of 8-12 subject matter experts tasked from 
the TRADOC proponent school. The CAAT members' specialties are directly related to 
the issues that are identified during mission analysis. A team chief, external to CALL, 
also is designated by the Department of the Army and becomes responsible for the 
development of the actual collection plan and all CAAT collection activities. Team 
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Chiefs are generally Lieutenant Colonels or higher depending on the size and difficulty of 
the collection effort. In addition, CALL assigns an Operations Officer and Operations 
NCO (OPSO/OPSNCO) to serve as advisors to the team chief on the collection process 
and as a subject matter experts on the use of CALL'S collection software CALLCOMS 
and IT architecture. Furthermore, CALL appoints an analyst to support the CAAT via a 
communication link from Fort Leavenworth. A Combat Camera Crewman can be 
employed by CALL if needed. 
Once the CAAT has been formed and there is sufficient time available, team 
members travel to CALL for a 3-5 day Collection Workshop. During this workshop the 
team members refine the collection plan, train team members on the lessons learned 
process and CALL's methodology. Assisting the CAATs is the software application 
CALLCOMS. CALLCOMS can be used to formulate the detailed collection plan, 
delineate collection responsibilities among CAAT members by Battlefield Operating 
System (BOS), and determine the collection methodology for each task. Once the CAAT 
is formed, the collection plan completed, and the CAAT members are trained, this phase 
of the process is complete. 
2.   Deployment and Linkup 
This phase begins with the deployment of the CAAT to the collection site or 
aerial/seaport of embarkation. The CAAT attempts to link-up with the host unit as soon 
as possible to begin collecting data and, more importantly, to build rapport. During this 
phase the OPSO/OPSNCO plays a significant role because they are responsible for 
arranging the counterpart link-up between the CAAT subject matter experts and observed 
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unit personnel.    This link-up can be at the staff, unit, or individual level based on the 
mission analysis conducted during Phase I. 
Once the CAAT team has linked-up with the host unit, they begin their collection 
effort. Host units must supply a CAAT team access to communication links that allows 
transmittal of e-mail. This communication link allows the CAAT to promptly relay data 
to CALL analysts via CALCOMS. Since the CAAT personnel are observers and not 
evaluators, their mission is to support and assist the unit as much as possible, along with 
collecting data for CALL. Because of this relationship, CAAT should be seen as an asset 
by the unit leadership and become an integral part of the operation. This phase is 
complete once the CAAT members linked-up with their host unit counterparts and 
establish a communication link to CALL. 
3.   Collection Operations 
Once on site, CAAT members begin to observe events and collect data in real- 
time. Collection team members join in on field missions to look for factual, observable 
events to document. They also perform in their area of expertise, for example carrying 
and operating communication equipment or even replacing a rifle infantryman.49 No 
retrospective accounts are taken and only data of a tactical or operational nature are 
collected. CAAT members are taught to look for systemic-induced problems rather than 
those due to soldier/leader error or anomalies. 
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Once an issue is recognized, they examine the events that transpired, try to find 
the cause and look ahead to identify the potential consequences. This process is called 
"threading the needle", tracing the path of a problem back to its source in order to gain a 
better understanding of what happened and why.50 As this process nears completion, 
team members document their observations and discussion of the events into 
CALLCOMS using its pre-formatted input form. 
While the collection team members work with the unit to gather data, the CAAT 
team chief consolidates their observations on a recurring basis. This information can be 
transmitted using the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) by way of the Internet, if team 
members are at a remote location, or downloaded onto the team chiefs computer via 
standard computer disk. The team chief, with the assistance of the OPSO/OPSNCO, then 
conducts a review of the subjective observations. The purpose of this review is to screen 
for content, edit grammar, ensure the observations are addressing the collection plan 
requirements, and identify problems that are potential warstoppers.51 Since the team 
chief is reviewing the actual file on CALLCOMS that the team member submitted, any 
cosmetic changes to the file can be completed without requiring further communication 
with the team member. If the team chief believes the team member has identified an area 
outside the scope of the collection plan or needs further clarification, he can discuss these 
issues with the observing team member and correct the CALLCOMS form as necessary. 
Once the team chief has completed his review of the CALLCOMS observations, 
they are forwarded electronically by the CALL OPSO/OPNCO to the CALL analyst at 
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Fort Leavenworth. During past operations, such as Operation Restore Hope, five to ten 
observations a day were transmitted to CALL. CALLCOMS also provides the team chief 
with the ability to track the current status of any observation and develop an ongoing 
issue tracking worksheet. A compilation of observations is provided to the supported 
unit commander during a briefing prior to the CAAT departing the theater. 
Moreover, CALL is able to support the collection of passive observations from 
members of the force. At this time, soldiers throughout the Army can input observations 
directly to CALL using the CALLCOMS software located on the CALL web site. Once 
an observation is presented, an analyst is assigned to assist in processing the observation 
and maintains close contact with the submitter until the procedure is complete. As an 
observation is forwarded to CALL, it moves into the next phase of the lessons learned 
process. 
4.   Analysis 
During the analysis phase, the raw data of observations gets processed into 
lessons through an expanded interpretation method that includes feedback from experts 
around the Army. Even while the CAAT is still deployed and gaining additional 
observations to support the collection plan, the analyst at CALL is working on taking the 
CALLCOMS observation previously forwarded to him electronically via FTP and 
converting it into a lesson. As these observations are received, the analyst transfers them 
into the CALLCOMS Database (CALLCOMS DB). Supporting documents, such as 
video, also are received via the Internet and converted so they can be added to the 
database. 
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Observations then are categorized in accordance with the BOS as outlined in 
TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9. Once the observations are indexed, they are scanned for 
formatting and grammatical errors, and checked to insure they maintain individual or unit 
anonymity. As the analyst works on observations, he or she relays questions back to the 
team, as necessary, to resolve conflicts and refine the collection effort. Observations then 
are posted on electronic bulletin boards on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
(SIPRNet) and sent electronically to the appropriate specialists at TRADOC agencies to 
solicit feedback.52 
The analyst also validates the data coming in from the field. Validation occurs 
when the current observation is compared with past information contained in the CALL 
DB to determine frequency and impact. Feedback from the TRADOC experts is used to 
determine if the current observation is new knowledge or an expansion of existing 
organizational knowledge. Correspondingly, it can render additional new questions or 
issues that TRADOC experts would like to see the CAAT team address. This three-way 
communication between TRADOC experts, the CALL analyst, and the CAAT Team 
Chief occurs almost daily. 
Upon completion of the screening by the analyst, the observation can be released 
to commands that are rotating into the theater to support their training initiatives. The 
CALL Director, working in conjunction with the deployed units and the follow-on unit's 
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released by CALL until the observed Task Force Commander allows it."54   It is at this 
point that the observations are codified as lessons. 
5.   Distribution and Archiving 
When the CAAT returns from its deployment, the team members and the assigned 
CALL analyst are responsible for insuring that all lessons are categorized by BOS and 
compiled into an initial impressions product. A draft of the coordinating initial 
impressions report is produced by the CAAT, and it is staffed-out to all interested 
commands and agencies for comment. Normally, agencies receive an initial product 
within two to three weeks. Once the coordinating initial impressions report is sent out, 
the CAAT departs CALL, which officially ends their tasking. At this point the OPSO is 
responsible for finalizing the collection product. Any appropriate comments from the 
staffing process are added to the final product by the OPSO. Copies of the final 
impressions report are forwarded to the numerous Army Commands as a guide for future 
contingencies. 
Simultaneously with this distribution, the product is placed in the CALL Database 
(CALL DB). The CALL DB is a 5-Petabyte storage site of both classified and 
unclassified data. It serves as the Army's electronic archives of all operations orders, 
situation reports, and key briefings on post-1973 Army contingency operations. It also 
contains CTC take home packages, all final exercise reports, all training lessons learned 
and user feedback on articles from previous CALL publications.55   This automation tool 
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allows lessons that are stored to be accessed using various methods. CALL DB can be 
browsed using several methods: the Library of Congress subject coding system, attributes 
of the event (i.e. time, location, date, or operation), according to the task, conditions, and 
standards applied by the CAAT team, or a simple word search.56 
After the final impressions report is completed, the CALL Director, in 
coordination with the Lessons Learned Division, determines whether other CALL 
products should be developed to further disseminate the information. CALL uses Push 
and Pull strategies to distribute its lessons. Push distribution is accomplished when 
information is sent from CALL out to its client base. This can be done through 
customized or mass market products. CALL also can use pull distribution which is 
keeping information in a central, accessible area for uses by its clients. Pull distribution 
is done through self-service from the CALL website and Internet access to the CALLDB. 
The customized products are in the form of training vignettes, handbooks or 
exportable training packages. They are made in response to request from FORSCOM 
units to prepare for operating in a particular environment. Examples are the handbooks 
that were created for elements of the 10th MD before deploying to Haiti and the training 
scenarios that were developed for units in Europe to utilize at the CMTC preceding 
deployment to Bosnia or Kosovo. Mass-market products are in the form of the CALL 
newsletters, the bi-monthly News From The Front bulletin, Training Quarterly 
publication, CTC Quarterly bulletins, and special editions. These products are aimed at 
reaching the widest possible audience and are published on paper, CD-ROM, or sent via 
e-mail. 
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The last channel is self-service from the CALL web page.   The goal of this 
service is to be a "one-stop shop where military users can find the information they need 
to   improve   training,   prepare   for   a   contingency   operation,   or   gather   research 
information."57 All of CALL'S latest publications are available on the web page. A user 
can go to the web site and download or read the current products. If the customer desires 
to gain access to back issues of products or the CALL DB, they can fill out a registration 
form on the web site and submit it electronically.   Once the CALL Executive Officer 
reviews the application, verifies the customer and their need for access, a password and 
user identification is sent to the customer through the postal system.    Once a customer 
has access to the CALL DB they can use software tools to access 2.5 million pages of 
data related by subgroups. While the user enters key search words or terms, the software 
using  artificial  intelligence  graphically displays  information by themes  of related 
subgroups that allows the user to rapidly sort and retrieve whatever information is 
needed.58 
Whatever the method of dissemination, push or pull, that is deemed to be 
appropriate, the most important function of this last phase of the Lesson Learned Process 
it to make sure that they have the widest possible impact on the total Army. Because 
budget constraints do not permit CALL to print all of its products down to the 
Company/Team Level, they authorize and encourage local reproduction to get access to 
the lowest levels of the organization. CALL also sees the website as a means to search 
and download tailored information, lessons, and TTP as needed. 
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E.        SUMMARY 
To meet the challenge of operating in an environment that has become 
increasingly complex and unstable, the Army has sought to become a learning 
organization. As a learning organization, the force could rapidly collect and transfer 
knowledge to make the necessary modifications in its TTPs to increase effectiveness. 
CALL performs several key functions to enable the Army to operate as a learning 
organization. These functions are outlined in AR 11-33, Army Lessons Learned 
Program. This manual establishes the CALL methodology for collecting and analyzing 
field data and distributing, integrating, and archiving lessons from combat operations and 
training events. The use of information technology has augmented the methodology by 
providing standardized planning, collecting, and analyzing tools and an alternative 
dissemination platform. 
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V. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AT CALL 
"The power of the microprocessor [is] the fact that shared 
information can compress time and increase effectiveness, not by a little, 
but by a lot."5* 
A. IT ARCHITECTURE 
IT architecture can be defined as the underlying framework that determines and 
describes the IT resources required by an organization to meet its goals and achieve its 
vision. The fundamental components of any Information System architecture are its 
hardware, software, policies, and network.60 When CALL decided to adopt information 
technology solutions to aid in overcoming the deficiencies that its old "paper and pencil" 
system had encountered, they sought to find a unifying framework for all aspects of the 
lessons learned process. This framework would have to support not only the collection 
teams in the field, the analyst and archivist at Fort Leavenworth, but also units located 
throughout the world. It was with this in mind that CALL sought to develop an 
Information Technology architecture to meet all of the diverse demands on its resources. 
This required identifying the functions that the IT infrastructure must support. CALL 
determined that the key functions were: for collection teams to be able to input data and 
electronically send this data to an analyst for processing, the capacity to store data for 
future retrieval, the capability to search data by various methods, and the ability of 
CALL'S clients to gain access to the data via the Internet.   These key functions have 
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served as design parameters for the development of the information system that CALL 
has put into place. 
B. CALL'S 3-TIER ARCHITECTURE 
To support the key functions CALL identified as being paramount to 
successfully transferring its lessons learned process to a fully integrated IT process, it 
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Figure 5. CALL'S IT Architecture 
The 3-Tier architecture was an attempt to overcome the limitations of older legacy 
systems.   By separating presentation, processing, and data into distinct entities CALL'S 
system permits the parallel development of future hardware, application, or database 
upgrades without requiring a complete overhaul of the existing system. This design not 
only decreases upgrade development time, but also has a significant cost savings since 
only one tier needs replacing at a time, not the entire system.61 
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1. Tier One 
Tier One of this architecture also is classified as the Client Tier. It is responsible 
for the presentation of the data, receiving user request in HTML, and controlling the user 
interface. The client can be any member of CALL, DoD government employees, or U.S. 
Military personnel who have been approved access to the CALL DB by the Operations 
Cell at Fort Leavenworth.62 
To request access to the CALL DB, a client must complete the Access Request 
Form located on the CALL web site. This standardized request form is converted into an 
e-mail text message that is forwarded to the Operations Cell. The Operation Cell 
assesses the individual's need to use the database and determines whether to grant access 
to the FOUO or classified information database. Once approval is granted, the client is 
issued a USERED and password to gain access to the specified database. 
If the client has been granted FOUO access, they can use a PC with an Internet 
connection and Web Browser to enter the database. Once connected to the CALL web 
page, clients can enter the assigned USERED and password to issue an HTML request to 
gain access to information within the CALL DB. When this request has been passed, 
they move into Tier Two of the architecture. If the client is attempting to access the 
classified database, they must gain access through computers that are attached to the 
SIPRNet. Members of CALL must gain access through the 4 PC linked to the SIPRNet 
located in the classified materiel room of CALL. 
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Once the client's request returns from processing by Tier Two and Tier Three, it 
will be formatted as either a text or image file. For the client to view or read these files, 
they must have Adobe Acrobat and TIFF image viewer applications loaded onto their 
PCs. The CALL web site has both of these applications available for downloading by the 
client. 
2. Tier Two 
The second tier of the architecture is called the Application-Web Server Tier. 
This tier protects the data from direct access by the client. It uses middleware located on 
an application server to conduct interactions with the database translating client calls into 
database queries and then translating the data from the database into a formatted 
presentation for the client. This important function is performed by Excalibur's 
RetrievalWare 6.7 software application. 
RetrievalWare 6.7 is a framework for information retrieval on an enterprise wide 
network. It combines two online search capabilities, adaptive pattern recognition and 
semantic network analysis, into a method for searching disparate databases for text, 
scanned images, video, and audio documents.63 Adaptive pattern recognition is a search 
technique that analyzes and matches binary patterns to locate errors such as misspellings 
or bitmaps which otherwise would not be presented to the client. This fuzzy logic 
technique allows for an expanded search of documents that would be excluded because of 
user-input error or optical scanning character recognition errors. The Semantic Network 
Analysis searches for words in context by recognizing word meanings and relationships. 
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This allows the client to drill down into the database using very specific queries. 
Although RetrievalWare does not permit SQL searches, the quality of the results and 
document rankings are much higher based on the search techniques it does permit. 
As soon as the client inputs his search parameters, RetrievalWare accesses the 
CALL DB searching from its various libraries. This is the transition point from Tier Two 
to Tier Three. When the search is complete it presents the client with a list of files that 
match the search parameters. The client can then select a file for viewing. 
RetrievalWare displays the information in a format that is supported by Adobe Acrobat 
or TIFF Image Viewer. This display of information is the transition from Tier Two back 
to Tier One and completes the client's service request. 
The application server that supports RetrievalWare is run on one of the four 
ProLiant Compaq network servers administered by the ISD Branch. These servers have 
up to two processors operating at between 667 MHZ to 1 GHZ each, 125GB external disk 
arrays, and 90GB expandable storage capacity. Although the application server is 
physically located with servers that support the CALL DB, it is logically separated to 
allow for a three-tier architecture. Tape backups of the data contained in the CALL DB 
are located at the Fort Leavenworth DOM and maintained by the Special Projects 
section of the ISD. 
3. Tier Three 
The last tier of the architecture is the Data-Server Tier. This tier is responsible for 
all data storage.   CALL'S data storage of all classified and unclassified TTPs, lessons 
learned, OPORDs, AARs, ROEs, and military relevant professional articles, is located in 
the CALL DB.   The CALL DB is also linked to the Combat Arms Research Library 
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Database (CARL DB), TRADOC DB, and various other databases throughout the Army. 
The CALL DB is a relational database that currently has 5 Petabytes of storage and is 
expandable, as future storage needs increase. The database is run on the same supermini 
computers that support the application server and uses the Excalibur Electronic Filing 
System (EFS) as the Database Document Management System (DBMS). 
EFS allows documents to be stored in accordance with international archival 
standards and displayed in a format following what the RD branch classifies as a "File 
Drawer." The "File Drawer" analogy is an attempt to structure the records in a method 
that is easily accessible and user friendly to members of the DoD. Since military records 
previously have been kept in large multi-drawer file cabinets, the RD Branch sought to 
use this common military storage arrangement within the CALL DB. When a user 
accesses the database, he is presented with a "Cabinet" that contains historical files from 
a particular storage library. Once a cabinet is selected, a list of "Drawers" is displayed. 
In each of these drawers are numerous "Folders" and each folder, in turn, contains 
numerous "documents".*4 Documents can be text, slide presentations, audio, video, or 
imagery files. 
Another important aspect of the Data Storage Tier is the method in which the RD 
processes records for input into the CALL DB. Processing of records is done in two 
basic ways based on whether it is in paper or electronic format. Records received in a 
paper format are converted to digitized form using PowerScan or StageWorks scanning 
software. 
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These software solutions allow for full page Optical Character Recognition while 
conducting batch oriented processing. This provides the RD branch with the capability to 
scan up to a thousand pages a day of older paper files into digitized text and images if 
required. RD Archivist organize and prepare the documents for input and then load them 
into the scanner. All documents are scanned as single page files although the software 
allows for multi-page scanning. Although this decision increases the amount of space 
required to store a document and increases the complexity of the File Management 
System, it is based on improving user access by decreasing the wait time to download a 
file via the Internet.65 Once the scanning is complete, the digitized documents are then 
classified and uploaded into the appropriate CALL DB by the Special Projects section 
located at DOEVL Documents that are received in electronic format are classified and 
uploaded by the RD branch directly into to CALL DB. 
C. CALLCOMS SOFTWARE 
Equally important to the current network architecture that CALL has established 
to assist in the storage and dissemination of lessons learned is the software application it 
developed to aid the collection process. As CALL sought a way to increase the 
efficiency of the collection process, they conducted an in-house development of a 
software tool that would support all of the requirements of the CAAT. This software, 
CALLCOMS, assists the CAAT in five key functions: Collection Plan Building, Issue 
Tracking, Observation Entry, Administration and Trend Analysis are the five modules of 




expects to migrate this application to Tier Two and the CALLCOMS DB to Tier Three 
during the next fiscal year.66 
During the Mission Analysis phase of the collection operations, the Collection 
Plan Building module is used by the CAAT to identify the parent issues and sub-issues 
for which  the  data will  be  collected.     It  also  permits  the  CAAT  to  delineate 
responsibilities to the identified questions among the CAAT members.    The Issue 
Tracking module allows the CAAT Team Chief to keep abreast of the status of each 
issue.    It depicts where in the collection process that issue is and when events are 
scheduled that will likely initiate data for an issue.    Once a CAAT begins active 
collection, the Observation Entry module entitles team members to enter data directly 
into  the  pre-formatted  form.     This  data  is  then  automatically  entered  into  the 
CALLCOMS DB.   The Administration module equips the CAAT with the ability to 
transmit files and data from his deployed location to the analyst located at CALL 
Headquarters. 
Once an analyst approves an observation, it is added to the CALLCOMS DB. 
Currently, there are approximately 15,000-18,000 observations located in this database.6? 
The Trend Analysis permits users to conduct searches of the database for past 
observations. Limitations to CALLCOMS are that it can only conduct pre-defined 
queries and does not support SQL-style queries that are typical of a system like Microsoft 
Access. 
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D. CALL GATEWAY WEBSITE AND LAN 
The last key piece of technology that is designed to assist CALL in completing its 
mission is the CALL Gateway web site and internal CALL LAN. The CALL gateway is 
an Internet web site designed to assist CALL in the passive collection of lessons learned 
and as a mechanism for the dissemination of TTP and lessons learned to its customers. 
To goal of the Gateway is to be "a one-stop shop where military users can quickly find 
information to improve training, prepare for a contingency operation, or gather research 
information."68 To meet this challenge, the ISD develops and maintains a homepage 
that has links to current CALL products, the CALL DB, Training Resources, U.S and 
International News agencies, and the Army homepage. 
The CALL LAN is in place to increase office productivity and communication 
within the organization and with its customers. The network uses Novell Netware 4.11 
Operating System to link its 125 PC's to each other and the Internet. The LAN allows 
members of the organization to tap into the CALL DB, CALLCOM DB, and share files 
with a download speed of 1.54 MBS via a T-l Ethernet connection. To run these 
services, ISD has established a server farm of 30 servers of different makes and models. 
These servers run the Gateway as well as provide file storage and print services for the 
LAN, E-mail for members of CALL, and FTP services for deployed CAAT team 
members. 
Although this robust IT infrastructure is currently in place, CALL, as part of the 
Defense  Information  Technology Testbed  (DITT),  is  constantly looking  for new 
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technologies to assist in fulfilling its core mission of collecting, analyzing, archiving, and 
disseminating of lessons learned to the total Army. The goal of these future technology 
enhancements is to enable CALL to furnish tactical commanders with the right 
information at the right time in the right format.69 
E. SUMMARY 
When CALL adopted an information technology solution to overcoming the 
deficiencies that its old "paper and pencil" system had encountered, they developed a 3- 
Tier Architecture to support all aspects of the lessons learned process. Users can now 
access and search CALL's vast data repositories via an Internet connection. By 
establishing Client, Application, and Data tiers, CALL has the ability to separate the 
presentation, processing, and database functions into distinct entities. This permits the 
parallel development of future hardware, application, or database upgrades without 
requiring a complete overhaul of the existing system. In addition to the architecture, the 
development of the CALLCOMS software application provides CAAT teams with a 
planning, collection, and analysis tool designed to improve their efficiency 
69
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VI.   ANALYSIS OF CALL'S ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
"The different parts of an organization can fit well together and 
function effectively, or fit poorly leading to problems."70 
GALBRAITH'S STAR MODEL 
Understanding the dynamics of organizational design, either explicitly or tacitly, 
is essential for leaders to effectively organize the work of their individuals toward 
achieving the organization's stated goal or mission. Jay Galbraith identified the policy 
domains or subsystems of an organization's design that could be altered to bring about 
the desired state of effectiveness. These policy variables are Task, Structure, Information 
and Decision Process, People, and Reward Systems.71 In addition to the five 
- 
Structure 
T*ik Decision Process 
Re wird System People 
c— 
Figure 6. Galbraith's Modified Star Model 
policy variables identified by Galbraith, a sixth domain of Culture should be added to the 
model. (Figure 6)    Culture a powerful force of shaping the behavior of individuals and 
groups and can have profound impacts on all of the other domains. 
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For an organization to operate effectively, all of its branches, components, or 
subparts must be consistently structured and managed by its leadership. For management 
to improve existing task performance, policy and system variables can be changed to 
bring about the new desired state. However, because the variables are interdependent, a 
change in one variable can result in a change in any of the others for better or worse. 
Therefore, organizational design changes must be comprehensive in nature and will 
require coordination, compensation, or reinforcement of all the variables.72 
B.        KEY ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
Every organization exists within the context of the other groups, organizations, 
governments and regulations that impact its ability to perform in its market.73 This 
interaction of elements is considered the organizational environment. For CALL, two 
key environmental factors have had a profound impact in its ability to perform its primary 
mission within the Army. 
First, since the end of the Gulf War, the number and spectrum of Operations 
Other Than War (OOTW) missions conducted by the Army has increased exponentially. 
This has resulted in a transformation of the focus of FORSCOM units to prepare for an 
OOTW mission, as opposed to conventional warfare as in the past. Because OOTW 
missions are different in scope and task composition then conventional warfare units have 
found that current Field Manuals do not adequately address the best methods to perform 
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and train to be successful in this environment. The deficiencies of the Army publication 
and training system have been offset by CALL'S ability to provide relevant and timely 
TTPs for training units before they deploy. 
Secondly, The Department of the Army maintains strict budgetary control over 
the activities of CALL. The operational budget that CALL receives each fiscal year as 
part of the Combined Arms Center is approximately $67,000.74 These funds are used to 
continually run the day to day operations at CALL headquarters, upgrade its IT 
architecture, and publish and disseminate its current line of products to clients. In order 
to initiate new collection operations or create a CAAT, CALL must first get the approval 
of DA. Once approval is granted, CALL can request that CAAT members be tasked 
from the various TRADOC Proponent Schools. Additional funds to support the 
collection operation will be appropriated to CALL for this mission. This strict control 
over what missions CALL can support, by use of its funding and tasking authority, gives 
DA the ability to dictate exactly what types of missions CALL should focus its collection 
and lessons learned process on. 
C.        STRATEGY, TASKS, AND TECHNOLOGY 
An organization's strategy is the set of concepts that relate its means to its ends. 
The strategy defines how an organization's task procedures and technology will be 
employed to produce the end product.75    For CALL, the end product is defined as 
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relevant lessons learned that are accessible for use by the total force. All of CALL'S 
divisions, except the UAN, are focused on helping the organization reach its end product. 
As the Army has moved into a period of greater uncertainty, caused by the requirement to 
accomplish any of a diverse spectrum of missions, the speed at which validated TTPs and 
lessons are provided has become crucial. To achieve this end product, CALL has 
redesigned the means it must use to reach its desired endstate. The redesigned means is 
the automation of the key planning, collection, and dissemination tasks to decrease the 
time required to take an observation and transform it into a valid relevant lesson learned 
orTTP. 
At the operating core level, the information system software CALLCOMS is 
designed to increase the efficiency of CAAT team members during the planning and 
collection tasks. The CALLCOMS Collection Plan Building module is used by the 
CAAT to identify the parent issues and sub-issues that the data are collected for. It also 
permits the CAAT to delineate responsibilities of collecting data for the identified 
questions among the CAAT members. This functionality prevents redundancy of effort, 
since no two CAAT members are assigned to collect data addressing the same parent 
issue. It also should prevent members from wasting valuable time collecting observation 
data for issues that are outside the scope of the CAAT mission. 
For the middle line level, CALLCOMS Issue Tracking module allows the CAAT 
Team Chief to keep abreast of the status of each issue. It depicts where in the collection 
process that issue is and when events are scheduled that will initiate data for an issue. 
This information allows the CAAT Team Chief to ensure that no issue goes unobserved 
or to surge resources to more rapidly gather observation data for critical issues.   Once 
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observations are ready to be sent to the CALL analyst at Fort Leavenworth, the use of 
FTP or E-mail provides an Information Technology framework that permits the seamless 
transfer of information between the operating core and the strategic apex. 
For the last task, dissemination, CALL has sought to leverage the use of an 
Internet Portal as a mechanism for providing TTPs and lessons learned to its customers. 
The Internet Portal is intended to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
distribution process in several key ways. 
First, it permits interested users 24-hour access to the latest CALL products in 
electronic form from any PC with an Internet connection. This should not only decrease 
the dissemination time, because the information does not have to be sent through the U.S. 
Postal system, but also increases the number of recipients of the information. The 
dissemination of CALL products is no longer limited to Brigade and larger size 
organizations, but now any interested soldier can gain access. Secondly, the CALL DB 
containing products, TTPs, and lessons learned are also available to users with approved 
access via a Web Browser. This functionality, to access the CALL DB through the 
Internet, reduces the amount of time it takes for an interested user to search for specific 
information contained in CALL'S vast repositories. Instead of requesting information for 
CALL, via the telephone as in the past, and waiting for an analyst to search, package, and 
send the information to the user, they now can search the DB themselves using the 
RetrievalWare software. 
As with any IT solution, if the fundamental process is good prior to implementing 
the IT then productivity and efficiency should result. However, if the process is flawed, 
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IT will not solve the problem, but rather further exacerbate it. CALL'S strategy to 
improve the collection process tasks by incorporating the use of Information Technology 
has seen remarkable results. It was able to take a paperwork intensive task and simplify 
and speed up the procedure. With the use of CALLCOMS, the mechanism to transform 
an observation into a lesson learned has been reduced from a mean time of 4.21 days to 
2.64 days. 76 
MeanTime (Days) 
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Collection Collection 





Table 1. Extend Collection Process Model Data 
This reduction of 1.57 days reflects an increase in efficiency of 38% over the 
previous process. This increased productiveness enables CALL to quickly pass 
knowledge from deployed troops and embed them in the training program for follow-on 
troops. This permits units to use others' lessons to change their behavior prior to 
entering an environment where the mistake could be fatal. The importance of this was 
evident during Operation Restore Hope when lessons from the 10th Mountain Division 
were used to create training scenarios for the 25th Infantry Division's rotation to JRTC. 
The ability to practice likely situations and test TTPs proved invaluable and gave the 
soldiers the "feeling that I have already been there before."77 
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CALL'S use of the Internet Portal to assist in the dissemination of products and 
provide access to its information repositories also has shown an increase in efficiency of 
that task. It has reduced the mean time to search for information from CALL'S data 
repositories from 6.54 days to .902 days.78 
Document           Document 
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Table 2. Extend User Access Model Data 
This 86% reduction in time can be directly linked to replacing human procedure with an 
automated one consisting of a database containing Internet connectivity. This reduction, 
however, can be misleading because it is based on all users already having assigned 
userids. If the requester does not currently have an assigned userid and password from 
CALL, then the actual time savings is minimal at best. This is due to the primitive 
process for setting up an account to gain access to the CALL DB, which involves sending 
your userid and password through the U.S. Mail. Very few members of the Army are 
presently experiencing the actual benefit of this IT solution, because only 3000 accounts 
are currently established. 
Information Technology's ability to provide solutions to key tasks within CALL 
is important. CALL'S divisions use IT to facilitate the achievement of the organization's 
mission. It increases the efficiency of the collection and dissemination process and has a 
profound impact on the Structure and People variables of the Star Model. 
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D. STRUCTURE 
The organizational structure of CALL can best be described, using the Mintzberg 
Framework for Organizational Form, as a Machine Bureaucracy.79 Machine 
Bureaucracies generally have highly routine operating tasks, very formalized rules and 
procedures, and a distinct chain of command. Although military organizations 
traditionally have been seen as a prototypical machine bureaucracies, CALL has some 
important modifications to these traditional attributes. (Table 3) 
1           Attribute Machine 
Bureaucracy 
CALL 
Coordination Mechanism Standardized Work Standardized Work 
Key Part of Organization Technostructure Technostructure 
Specialization of Jobs Horizontal/Vertical Horizon tal/Vertical 
Training Little Much 
Indoctrination Low High 
Departmentalization Functional Product 
Unit Size Wide bottom, Narrow Top Wide bottom, Narrow Top 
Control High Level Low Level 
Liaison Devices Few Few 
Decentralization Limited Horizontal Decentralization 
Tech Systems Routine Routine 
Environment Simple and Stable Complex and Changing 
Power Resides Technocratic Technocratic 
Table 3. CALL'S Organizational Form 
One of the key aspects of CALL's structure is the coordinating mechanism used 
throughout the organization. Coordinating Mechanisms are the methods used to 
synchronize activities within an organization.«« For CALL, the Lessons Learned Process 
is used to transfer knowledge and as coordinating mechanism within the Army. The 
"checklist" of Standard Operating Procedures outlined in AR 11-33 and the collection 
software CALLCOMS are used to enforce the rules and procedures of the collection 
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process. For CALL, standardization of work is important because the operating core 
composition is different for each CAAT. By maintaining a rigid collection framework 
and standardized observation format, CALL can achieve symmetry between the 
collection efforts of various CAATs. Because the standardization of work is paramount 
for its success, the actual power within CALL resides in what Mintzberg calls the 
"Technostructure". For CALL, the Technostructure consists of the Military and Civilian 
Analysts who developed the checklist style SOP that CAAT teams are required to follow. 
Some of the significant attributes in which CALL departs from the traditional 
Machine Bureaucracy structure are Training, Control, and Departmentalization. Training 
is important to CALL because to be successful in its mission it must provide a vast 
amount of training to the OPSO/OPSNCO as well as the CAAT team members. Unlike 
most traditional organizations, CALL'S operating core is drawn from other organizations 
within its environment (TRADOC proponent schools). Because the operating core is 
untrained prior to each collection effort, it is paramount that they receive adequate 
training in order for them to provide any relevant data to the organization. 
CALL ensures that CAAT is trained to conduct its collection effort in two ways. 
First, they provide a seven day course on the Lessons Learned Process for each team 
prior to their deployment. This training teaches them the CALL Methodology and how 
to interact with the observed unit, writing skills, and collection planning. Secondly, an 
OPSO/OPSNCO from CALL is assigned to assist each CAAT while deployed. 
OPSO/OPSNCO are military officers and senior non-commissioned officers who have 
received   detailed   training   on   the   collection   methodology   by   members   of the 
technostructure. 
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Control is another attribute in which CALL'S structure is different from that of a 
traditional Machine Bureaucracy.      Typically, in a Machine Bureaucracy, decision- 
making authority is centralized.    Because the environment is stable, the chain of 
command dictates exactly what's expected to employees and anything other than that 
must receive special permission.81        In contrast, the environment CAAT members 
operate in is complex and changing. Because CAAT members are widely dispersed and 
may have only infrequent e-mail contact with the team chief, they are given wide latitude 
on their collection efforts. Although they have specific assigned collection requirements, 
which can be tasked in person or transmitted via an Internet connection, they also have 
the flexibility to capture observations outside the scope of their responsibility if the 
situation arises.     This loose control allows for the rapid collection of "target of 
opportunity" type observations, without having to wait for approval from high echelons 
which may result in missing the collection opportunity altogether. 
The last attribute that is a significant departure from a traditional Machine 
Bureaucracy structure is departmentalization. Departmentalization is the general 
principle for dividing work and coordinating activities. It is generally revealed by an 
organizational chart.82 CALL can be classified as departmentalized by Divisional or 
Product. An organization with a divisional structure aims to minimize the 
interdependences between its units, especially when the Information Technology in use 
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is a database.83 It is common for organizations that are customer or product oriented to 
adopt this configuration.84 The reasons for this classification are two-fold. First, 
CALL is separated into four major divisions: Lessons Learned, Information Systems, 
Research, and University After Next. Each division maintains a certain independence in 
developing, testing, processing, and distributing materials in their respective area. This 
type of departmentalization creates self contained divisions, each of which are 
responsible for everything to do with a product.85 Lastly, the only interdependencies 
among CALL'S four branches are linked to the development and implementation of the 
CALL DB, which serves as a repository of lessons learned and all the organization's 
work products. 
CALL'S coupling of traditional attributes of a Machine Bureaucracy, with a 
substantial training program, product configuration, and low level of control have created 
an organization that maintains high efficiency while overcoming the dehumanizing and 
boring nature of standardized tasks. Information Technology has permitted CALL to 
standardize work within the operating core using CALLCOMS and to adopt a product 
configuration. 
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E.        PEOPLE 
The People component deals with changes to the skills, training, and development 
required of individuals that are part of the workforce. As with most organizations that 
have such a wide range of missions and responsibilities, CALL requires a myriad of 
individual skill sets. 
CALLs military personnel must have substantial tactical experience in both 
command and staff positions and a strong knowledge of current doctrine. The Lessons 
Learned Division's civilian analysts require not only an understanding of current doctrine 
and its historical context, but also strong analytical and writing skills. Members of the 
UAN Division must possess strong theoretical and analytical skills that will allow them 
to envision the emerging knowledge needs of the future force and design systems to meet 
those needs. The Research Division's archivists, historians, record managers, librarians, 
and security specialist all require an in-depth understanding of record management and 
storage processes. 
With the introduction of Information Technology into CALL's architecture, the 
existing skill set was expanded to meet the challenges that these systems introduce. All 
members of the organization require basic computing skills. Members of the LLD are 
now required to learn to use the CALLCOMS software and basic TCP/IP skills to 
successfully accomplish their work. The biggest change in required skills occurs in the 
ISD and RD Branches. Because of the implementation of IT solutions to the collection 
process, the RD branch converts from standard file management system to one that is 
completely reliant on computer hardware and software.  Since the ISD is responsible for 
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maintaining the integrity of the data in CALL DB and the conversion of paper documents 
to electronic form, it has had to hire eleven people that have strong technical backgrounds 
and show a lot of computer savvy.86 These are different people than were required in the 
past. 
The ISD branch was expanded to not only provide local technical support to the 
various divisions within CALL, but to maintain the IT architecture itself. This expanded 
responsibility included the installation and monitoring of the LAN, Internet Portal, Server 
Farm, and in house development of application software. As a result, ISD workers now 
require extensive knowledge about TCP/IP, Website management, PC repairs, software 
engineering, and coding. 
Initially, CALL's automation was seen as a method to remove vertical layers of 
the organization hierarchy. Computer Information Systems, Databases, and E-mail 
increase the average user's information capacity and eliminate the need for a large middle 
management.87 Within CALL, the LLD was able to reduce the number of analysts from 
a high of 40, after Operation Desert Storm, to the 10-12 currently used. Even with the 
reduction of manning, the use of IT systems has diminished overall time to transform 
observations into lessons or TTPs. A by-product of the incorporation of IT, however, 
has been a significant increase in the number of personnel required to support the current 
architecture. In recent years, the LLD branch has seen a reduction in the number of 
analysts, while the ISD and RD Branches personnel requirements have increased by 25%. 
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The skill level and capacity of the People variable helps define the tasks and 
processes that an organization can adopt and the structure that will best facilitate an 
increase in efficiency.88 Even so, an organization's Reward System direct impacts its 
ability to attract and retain qualified personnel. 
F.        REWARD SYSTEM 
Closely tied to the People component is the organization's Reward System. This 
component includes organizational incentives to motivate and inspire the operating core 
to achieve its tasks. Rewards generally are classified as intrinsic (psychological rewards 
from membership) or extrinsic (rewards received from others).89 In the Army, a number 
of rather intangible concepts such as duty, honor, selfless service, esprit de corps, 
reputation, and inclusion in the tradition of the institution are important factors in the 
force's intrinsic non-task reward system. These values are important to motivating the 
civilian and military analysts who are responsible for the collection and dissemination 
portion of CALL missions. 
In addition to the values that serve as the foundation of the Army,' CALL has an 
additional factor that helps it to motivate its members. This important factor is task 
significance. Task significance is the impact the work is believed to have on others.90 
Because soldiers' lives may be at stake, members of CALL know the importance of not 
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only doing a thorough job, but also ensuring it is completed in a timely manner. Failure 
to do so could result in the loss of lives, while success can assist units in achieving their 
mission. Task significance leads to members of CALL experiencing a sense of 
meaningfulness in their work, internal work motivation, and a high level of job 
satisfaction. 
However, these intangible factors only can be expected to do so much to improve 
efficiency within CALL. CALL must build a valuable extrinsic reward package on top of 
these core values to help sustain its work force. Because of the diverse interests of the 
members of CALL, the Branch chiefs tailor a reward package to meet their work forces 
particular needs. In most cases this package includes a very limited combination of 
education, promotion, monetary, and family incentives. 
The first incentive is to increase the educational opportunities within the 
organization. As with any organization that has a high reliance on Information 
Technology to conduct its mission, CALL uses technology training and certification as a 
reward for superior job performance. This allows the individual to gain additional 
proficiency sets, which can then be used to achieve skill variety within their respective 
division. Skill variety adds to the meaningfulness of the work experience and generally 
increases job satisfaction. Increasing the workers IT skills, however, can have 
unintended results. As CALL has increased the training and certification opportunities of 
its members, it has raised individuals' marketability to outside organizations and resulted 
in a significant turnover in the ISD and RD Branches. 
The financial incentives that CALL can implement are limited within the 
framework of existing Federal statues.  Managers have the ability to grant their civilian 
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employees with step increases as a bonus for superior job performance. Military 
members are not authorized to pay bonuses for performance. Because of the lack of 
availability of financial incentives, CALL finds it difficult to compete with civilian 
organizations to retain some of its critical technological skill workers. Another incentive 
is to reward superior job performance with time off. This generally is very effective with 
the military members of the organization. Increasing the amount of time that a service 
member is home with their family reduces the traditional strains found in many military 
families.    Thus promotion becomes the primary means of unnecessary compensation. 
Promotion is another traditional incentive that has limited application within 
CALL. Because a significant amount of the organization are active duty military 
members, they are subject to centralized promotion boards. Although their performance 
while assigned to CALL is evaluated on an OER or NCOER, it does little to influence 
their actual promotion. This is due to the nature of centralized promotion boards putting 
increased weight on job performance in key leadership positions such as command and 
primary staff. Since the positions at CALL do not fall into this category, they are 
generally weighted less when the board convenes. However, the civilian members of 
CALL can be selected for promotion within the organization based on job performance. 
The current Reward System used by CALL has some significant deficiencies. It 
currently is structured to rely heavily on the intrinsic motivating factors and not the 
extrinsic rewards. As CALL continues to exploit cutting edge technological solutions to 
solve its collection and dissemination missions, CALL struggles to maintain its technical 
support personnel. The more training and educational opportunities it provides the higher 
the likelihood workers with these new skill sets will seek a civilian job opportunity with 
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greater pay.   Without comparable promotion and financial incentives, CALL will not be 
able to compete with the civilian workforce and face qualified personnel shortages. 
G.       CULTURE 
A key to the success or failure of any organization to attain productivity is the 
influence that culture has on its operation. Culture comprises the "values, norms, and 
expectations shared by the organization's members."91 The culture provides members 
with a sense of identity, enhances commitment to the organization's mission, and 
reinforces standards of behavior.92 At the root of the organization's culture is a set of 
core characteristics that are valued by its members. For the Army, a core characteristic 
that has emerged is an openness of communication. 
The openness of communication comes from the fact that "good ideas have a high 
currency when lives are at stake."93 Leaders and the led conduct an open dialogue to 
reflect on why actions occur and finding appropriate solutions. The idea is that 
"information is not a source of power but an objective commodity that belongs to the 
organization, not to individuals."94 This leads to the rewarding of individuals who share 
information, as being team players, not necessarily those who come up with the idea.   It 
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is this openness that provides input to the lessons learned process and allows CALL to 
successfully conduct its mission. 
To support the Army's culture, CALL sees itself as the fundamental mechanism 
for sharing information across its parent organization. Its focus on "what units are doing, 
not who is doing it"95 also supports the values of teamwork and not seeking personal 
credit for ideas. By establishing a method that supports the unanimity of sources for 
lessons, CALL is reinforcing the idea that members of the Army can be creative in their 
use of TTPs. Leaders are allowed to be innovative and take reasonable risks. If they are 
successful, their new methods are spread through the entire force; if they fail, they are 
free to learn from their mistakes without reprisal. 
Another important function of CALL's culture is its ability to stress the 
importance of the organization's mission to members of the CAAT team that are 
temporarily assigned to the organization. During their methodology training, members 
of the LLD Branch reinforce the idea that sharing of information in critical by reminding 
the CAAT members "everything boils down to making sure the soldier in harms way has 
the knowledge needed to prevail and survive."** By transmitting information through 
stories about how CALL products have successfully impacted units in the past, it is able 
to introduce its core value to these members. 
Withm CALL, as most large diverse organizations, multiple subcultures exist. 
Two distinct subcultures have emerged along functional lines.   One supports the core 
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characteristic of the Army to promote openness of communication through the sharing of 
information; the other values the promotion of innovation. Although both subcultures 
accept the role of CALL, conflict exists when the organization's budget is allocated.97 
The first subgroup is composed of the elements that were part of CALL when it 
was founded in 1985. It includes elements of the LLD, ISD, and RD. This group feels 
that the most important core value of the organization is the facilitation of sharing 
information within the Army. They have accepted the use of Information Technology as 
a means to achieving this value, but feel that the core function of CALL should remain 
providing support to soldier. If funds are to be allocated, this group feels that they 
should be used to support the production of more frequent products, assist collection 
operations, or on the IT architecture to augment the support to the user.98 
The other subculture is composed of former pieces of the Army Knowledge 
Network. It includes the elements of UAN and RD. This group feels the most important 
core value is the promotion of innovation. This group sees IT as a method for providing 
enterprise-wide knowledge and learning management for the Army After Next. They 
value the innovation above everything else. If funds are to be allocated, this subculture 
feels it should be used to find solutions to tomorrow's challenges even if they diminish 
CALL effectiveness today. They are exploring cutting edge technology solutions for 
knowledge tools, knowledge applications, and learning applications. 
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CALL'S use of IT has created two distinct subcultures within the organization. 
One sees the technology as a method to support the Task policy variable. The other sees 
CALL'S primary role as serving as testbed for future innovations for the force. The close 
relationship between the Culture and People policy variables is evident by which 
individuals support each subculture. Those individuals who use IT to assist them 
complete their work, such as analysts, OPSO/OPNCOS, and historians feel it is a means 
to an end. The members of the organization with strong technical backgrounds and 
responsible for maintaining the IT architecture, want to see it continue to maintain a 
cutting edge level. 
H.       INFORMATION AND DECISION PROCESSES 
This component of the model includes the organization's decision mechanisms, 
the information the organization requires, and controls to make sure information is 
disseminated to its client base. As with most organizations that adopt IT solutions, 
CALL believed it could exploit the information processing power of the computer to 
improve service to its customers.99 n provides CALL with a method for decision- 
making, formalized data, and data transmission.100 
CALL'S mechanism for decision making is contained within the various modules 
of the CALLCOMS software. During the Mission Analysis phase of the collection 
operations, the Collection Plan Building module is used by the CAAT to identify the 
parent issues and sub-issues for which the data will be collected.   This serves as the 
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blueprint for the entire collection operation. As issues are identified, the CAAT Team 
Chief can assign collection assets (team members) to each area to ensure comprehensive 
coverage of the problem areas. 
Once the Collection Phase of the operation begins, the CALLCOMS Issue 
Tracking module allows the CAAT Team Chief to keep abreast of the collection effort. It 
depicts the current collection status of each issue, when the next event is scheduled that 
will likely initiate data, and what resources have been allocated to the issue. This 
provides the decision-maker with a greater understanding of the problem and real-time 
information to permit the surging of resources to an issue, if necessary. 
Finally, during the Analysis Phase of the operation, the CALLCOMS Trend 
Analysis module allows CALL to use mathematical models to identify existing trends in 
the observation data that it receives from the CAAT. This data can be used to modify the 
CAAT's current collection plan. Modification may result in additional resources or time 
being given to an issue that has shown to be a troublesome trend during analysis or needs 
further development. The Trend Analysis also can identify issues that may need 
coverage in a topical CALL newsletter or other publication. This supports the rapid 
transmittal of information to the force to correct a deficiency or problem area. 
IT supports the formalization of data by creating categories and storage 
schemes.101 CALL uses two methods to formalize data. The first is the use of a 
standardized observation collection form. As part of the active collection process, the 
form is part of the CALLCOMS software and is used by CAAT members to annotate the 
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task, condition, and information of each observation. For passive collection, a shell form 
is located on the CALL Web Site and allows users to enter the required information, 
which is then transmitted, to an analyst for review. Presently, CALL'S active collection 
process has provided a valuable means to formalize data, however since the passive input 
method has not experienced high user volume it has cause the adaptation of Active- 
Passive collection. 
The second method of formalization is found in storage of data. Whether the 
observation is active or passive, once it has been entered into the CALLCOMS DB it is 
categorized for storage by the relevant BOS that it supports. Users can then search 
CALLCOMS by BOS to identify various observations. The Trend Analysis module's 
models scour the stored data for recurring trends also use the BOS tags. This allows the 
formalized data to be fed back into the decision process.102 
The CALL DB contains operations orders, situation reports, CTC take home 
packages, all final exercise reports, all training lessons learned and user feedback on 
articles from previous CALL publications. These documents are tagged using several 
methods: the Library of Congress subject coding system, attributes of the event (i.e. time, 
location, date, or operation), according to the task, conditions, and standards applied by 
the CAAT team, or a simple word search. The RetrievalWare software that CALL 
utilizes to support user access into the DB supports searching for documents using any of 




The last important aspect of this component is the methods that data are 
transmitted to the organization clients. For CALL, it has sought to augment, and later 
replace, its paper product mailing with an Internet web page that provides access to all of 
its products and services. CALL sees the use of the web page and IT as "the way to do a 
better job getting our products to the Army."103 For CALL to be an effective 
organization, it must be able to facilitate the transfer of knowledge among its clients and 
change its behavior when required. Providing a valued service that is widely used by the 
Army can only do this. 
Although 75% of the respondents believe that information and products from 
CALL were of great value to the Army, most felt that the products were underutilized.104 
This is due to two prevalent problems. The first is that the current paper products are in 
limited distribution down to the Brigade level. This leaves most of the individuals who 
derive the greatest benefit from the TTPs that CALL produces without direct access to 
the paper copies. CALL has identified this as a large problem and has hoped the Internet 
would provide it with an easy solution. As a fix to this dissemination problem, the CALL 
Web Page provides access to all of it products and controlled access to'its databases. 
This has not occurred due to a lack of access to computer systems, a lack of knowledge in 
the userbase about this service, and the bureaucratic method used to gain access to the 
databases. 
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Currently most soldiers in the Army do not have direct access to computer 
systems or Internet connection in there work place. In most units, automation tools and 
e-mail accounts are limited to commanders and primary staff officers. This prevents the 
average soldier or leader from logging on to CALL'S webpage while on duty to download 
current CALL products. If they do have access to a computer at home, they must also 
use a much slower connection to download or search for data than would be available 
from a T-l LAN connection at the workplace. 
Another problem is CALL'S new dissemination process. It faces a lack of user 
knowledge about its existence. 41.9% of company grade officers who had just come 
from serving in key leadership positions as company commanders or platoon leaders did 
not even know that CALL had a website or provided its products via the Internet. Of 
those who knew about the web site, only 33% even used the service.105 If CALL wants 
to use the Internet as its primary dissemination method, it needs to increase users' 
awareness of its existence. As one respondent claimed "CALL is a misnomer, it should 
be called Center for Lessons Storage, because information does not make it to the actual 
user. 
The last issue is access to CALL databases. Because of the sensitivity of some of 
the information it possesses, CALL maintains tight control over access to its data. 
However, the bureaucratic process for setting up an account to gain access to the CALL 
DB, which involves sending a userid and password through the U.S. Mail, takes too long 
to be of any service.     Only 3000 registered users currently have access to the 
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CALLDB.106 If a soldier tries to use CALL to find a quick answer to a training issue or 
a TTP and has to wait days for a response, they are not likely use the resource again in 
the future. To be a more effective resource and provide a mechanism to change behavior 
and impact training, access must be more widely disseminated. 
I. SUMMARY 
. Understanding the dynamics of CALL'S design is essential to analyze the 
efficiency of its process and how effectively it achieves the organization's stated goal or 
mission. By looking at the organization through the six policy variables, one can see that 
many aspects of the organization are in congruence. The incorporation of IT has had an 
impact on all of the variables, however the Structure, Information and Decision Process, 
and Tasks variables need to be modified if CALL is to increase its process efficiency. 
One must remember, though, because the variables are interdependent, that a change in 
one variable can result in a change in any of the others for better or worse. 
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VII.   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.        CONCLUSIONS 
During the early 1990's an information technology architecture was introduced at 
CALL as means to improve the existing lessons learned process. Up until this time 
CALL had produced "little of enduring value because data overwhelmed our pencil-and- 
paper system."107 The goal of senior Army leadership was to use the capabilities of the 
technology to increase the efficiency of both the collection and dissemination of lessons 
throughout the Army. CALL'S improved rapid process would result in a significant 
increase to the effectiveness of all combat units.108 After six years, the information 
technology architecture and organizational design that CALL established has mixed 
results. Although it has shown a significant increase in its collection process efficiency, 
the dissemination of information has not provided either the efficiency or effectiveness 
that initially was sought. 
The incorporation of information technology on the collection process has 
increased efficiency because of a congruence between the policy variables of the Star 
Model, especially the Task, Structure, Information and Decision Processes variables. 
The key technologies that have helped achieve this congruence is the CALLCOMS 
software application and the FTP functionality of the Internet. CALLCOMS has 
provided the planning tools to assist the CAAT develop and manage its collection effort 
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(Task Variable). It supports the standardization of the collection process tasks so that the 
quality of data remains relatively consistent between CAATs (Structure Variable). It also 
provides a means to formalize the data so that it can be categorized and stored for later 
use by CALL analysts or clients (Information and Decision Process Variable) . The use 
of FTP protocol facilitates the need to accomplish more with fewer personnel because it 
allows a flattening of the organizational hierarchy through a internetted information 
process (Structure and People Variables). 
This congruence of variables has resulted in the reduction in time required to 
produce new and validated lessons to the force. In Somalia, CALL had an average 4-5 
days turn around from observation to validated lesson;109 this was reduced to 2-3 day 
during Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.110 This analytical data is supported by the 
empirical data gather from the Extend models that found the reduction in time to be from 
4.21 to 2.64, or a 38% improvement in efficiency of the collection process. 
While the effect of information technology on the dissemination process has not 
produced the intended improvements its has had significant positive impact. CALL'S 
dissemination process seems to be better suited to aid units that are preparing for large 
scale deployments. This is because they follow a product "push" dissemination strategy. 
This strategy identifies lessons or knowledge that would be useful to the force and sends 
it directly to the force. During preparations for operations in Haiti, CALL tapped into its 
existing database and developed tailored soldier handbooks to cover customs, TTPs, and 
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small unit procedures for conducting peacekeeping missions. These products were 
"pushed" to member of the 10th Mountain Division before they deployed as part of the 
train-up. They also were able to use the efficiency of the collection process to develop 
"push" scenario packages for units to rehearse operational tasks while at the CTCs before 
they deployed.111 The success of these type "push" products is evident in the 25th 
Infantry Division's experience in Haiti where they faced 23 of 26 JRTC scenarios that 
CALL developed for their pre-deployment train-up.'12 
The incongruence of the dissemination process is due to a disconnect between the 
Task, Structure, and Information Variables associated with the "pull" distribution 
strategy. This incongruence has created a dissemination process that is not efficient and 
reduces the overall effectiveness of the organization. The intent of the CALL Webpage 
is to allow users to gain quick access to information when they need something (Task 
Variable) .113 However, the existing bureaucratic process for setting up an account to 
gain access to the CALL DB, which involves sending a userid and password through the 
U.S. Mail, takes too long to be of any service (Task Variable). If a soldier tries to use 
CALL to find a quick answer to a training issue or a TTP and has to wait days for a 
response, they will not likely use the resource again in the future. Using empirical data 
from the Extend model, if a user does not already possess access to the CALLDB then it 
takes 22% longer to get information then simply contacting CALL via the telephone and 
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asking an analyst to find the information for them. Since, the incorporation of 
information technology has flattened the organizational hierarchy, few analysts are 
available to provide this service (Structure Variable). 
The intended "pull" of information has not occurred on a wide scale due to a lack 
of access to computer systems, a lack of knowledge in the user-base about this service, 
and the bureaucratic method used to gain access to the databases (Information Variable). 
Because the degree to which CALL achieves it goals depends on the quality of the work 
it publishes and its usefulness, if its customer-base does not know of its services or use it 
products, then it is not effective.114     My study found that 41.9% of company grade 
officers who had just come from serving in key leadership positions as company 
commanders or platoon leaders did not even know that CALL had a website or provided 
its products via the Internet.  Of those who knew about the web site, only 33% used the 
service.115     One respondent to the survey stated, "CALL produces good observations, 
but they are not widely used because they are not widely disseminated."116     In fact the 
top organizations outside of CALL and DOM to access the CALLDB are CAS3, DoD 
Contractors, CGSC, and Fort McClellan.117     This indicates that most of the requests 
came from members of the service not currently in key leadership positions but are 
currently obtaining military education.    To be a more effective resource and provide a 
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mechanism to change behavior and impact training, access must be more widely 
disseminated to members of FORSCOM. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although CALL has shown a significant increase in its collection process 
efficiency, the dissemination of information has not provided the efficiency or 
effectiveness that was initially sought. The following changes to the existing process 
would improve CALL'S performance in these key areas: 
• Increase user-base knowledge by going to TRADOC proponent schools and 
informing soldiers of CALL'S products and services. 
• Use push distribution strategy of products down to company/platoon level e- 
mail accounts. 
• Assign userids and passwords to all key leader positions down to platoon 
leader and require unit S-3 to manage passwords. S-3 shops can contact 
CALL to update passwords as new platoon leaders assume the position. 
The first change will increase potential clients' knowledge of the services that 
CALL can provide. By going to the TRADOC schools and conducting a one to two hour 
briefing as part of the Officer Basic, Officer Advance, and CAS3 courses, they will teach 
young officers about CALL and its services and reinforce the importance of information 
sharing. Officers exposed to this information early in their careers, will be more likely to 
realize the benefit of CALL and seek out their products or assistance. This should greatly 
improve the number of users and increase CALL'S impact as the Army's learning 
mechanism. 
As more Army units become linked via post LANs or use of the Internet, CALL 
can exploit this medium to further increase it reach. They can use the no-cost electronic 
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distribution of its products via E-mail to extend its dispersion from Brigade to 
company/platoon level. This will put CALL products in the hands of key leaders all the 
way down to the lowest levels of the organization. This type of deep penetration into the 
organization hierarchy will provide another substantial positive impact on CALL 
effectiveness to create shared learning across the organization. The challenge in this 
"push" distribution is to get and update E-mail addresses of all potential clients. This can 
be done by maintaining close contact with the MACOM Chief Information Officers or 
through a standardization of unit E-mail addresses that are linked to position not 
individual names. 
The last recommendation is to assign userids and passwords to all key leader 
positions down to and including  platoon leader positions.   This will allow any officer 
serving in a leadership position to gain access to the restricted CALL database.  Soldiers 
then will be able, through their first line leader, to get information, TTPs, and documents 
to assist training without incurring a substantial time lag. This will reinforce the use of 
CALL, its TTPs and lessons because of its responsiveness as an asset that is widely 
available. The difficulty in this method of creating widespread access to the CALL DB is 
in maintaining control of the userids and passwords.   This function can be done at the 
Battalion level, by the S-3 Training Office.   The S-3 can request the necessary userids 
and passwords and assign them to their current leaders.   Once a leader transfers out of 
that position, the S-3 will contact CALL and request that a new password be issued for 
that position account.   Again the key is not to link the userid to a person, but rather a 
position.   Centralizing the management of the accounts at the Battalion Operations and 
Training Office level, ensures that the individual responsible for the overall training plan 
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of the organization also is responsible for providing and encouraging access to CALL'S 
products and services. 
The impact of these changes within the Army would be significant. Not only 
would CALL show an increase in the efficiency of its dissemination of information, but, 
more importantly, it would provide a deeper penetration into organizations' client-base. 
This penetration would improve CALL'S effectiveness because its products would be 
better known, easily accessed, and widely used. 
97 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
98 
APPENDIX A.   SIMULATION MODELS OF CALL'S 
COLLECTION PROCESS AND USER ACCESS TO THE CALL DB 
A. EXTEND SIMULATION SOFTWARE 
The purpose of using the Extend model software is to develop a logical 
description of how a system performs a real world activity. This model can be used for 
carrying out experiments on the system over time to determine inefficiencies of design 
and identify chokepoints or problem areas before actual implementation.''8 
The Extend software creates a representation of the key tasks that CALL must 
perform in order to accomplish their mission. These results serve as a way to measure 
the impact that the incorporation of IT has had on the collection process and the ability of 
CALL'S customers to rapidly gain access to the products and lessons that the 
organization produces and manages. 
To determine the impact that IT has had on the efficiency of the process, four 
models were developed to replicate the previous and current CALL process for collecting 
and analyzing observations and user access to information contained in- CALL's data 
storage repositories. The data used as a basis for the input variables for the models are 
derived from interviews with members of CALL, historical data provided by the ISD and 
AO Branch, or from personnel observations of the execution of specific tasks by either 
members or clients of CALL. 
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B.        GENERAL MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions were used in the development of the basic models: 
1. Collection Process Models. 
• CAAT Team Members' general writing and processing of observations does 
not improve significantly over the 30-60 days that they are deployed. 
• Since CAAT SMEs have similar military experience, service time, and skills, 
they do not have significantly different observation processing success rates. 
• Work day is 18 hours, 7 days a week. 
• Each simulation represents 30 days of collection effort. 
• Communication link to CALL is established before collection operations 
begin. 
• All Internet connections are made using a 56K modem, while all faxes use a 
14.4K modem. 
2. Database Access Models. 
• Access to information is available 24 hours, 7 days a week. 
• Users requiring access are members of the United States Armed Forces only. 
• All requests via Internet will be made using a 56K modem. 
• All requests without IT will be via telephone. 
• The Internet portal does not experience any significant down time that 
prevents user access. 
• Users know exactly what information they want to search for and the topics 
are located in CALL's database. 
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C.        CALL   OBSERVATION   COLLECTION   PROCESS   MODEL   USING 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
1.   Purpose. 
The purpose of this model is to depict the current CALL observation collection 
process that includes various types of Information Technology. (Figure 7) This process 
incorporates the use of the CALLCOMS software to assist CAAT members in the 
planning, collection, and processing of observations in the field.   It also depicts the use 
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Figure 7. CAAT Observation Collection Process w/IT 
of FTP, to transmit CALLCOMS forms from forward deployed locations to CALL at 
Fort Leavenworth via established communication links. 
2.   Key Tasks Depicted in the Model. 
The following tasks are pivotal in the accurate depiction of this process: 
• Observation Collection. 
• Draft CALLCOMS Form. 
• Review Observations by CAAT Team Chief. 
• Returned to CAAT SME for Refinement. 
• Analyst Review. 
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•    Analyst Input into CALLCOM DB. 
3. Explanation of Key Task Blocks and the Data Used for Each Task. 
a. Observation Collection. 
This block of the model simulates the CAAT SMEs' daily collection of 
observations throughout their deployment in the theater of actual operations. There are 
usually 3-5 observations a day that arrive to the system in a Poisson distribution with a 
mean value of 6 hours per observation. 
b. Draft CALLCOMS Form. 
This block depicts the time that it takes a CAAT member to record their 
observations in the correct format using the CALLCOMS application software on their 
assigned PC. This value is calculated by a random number generator following a normal 
distribution with a mean of 2 hours and a standard deviation of 1. 
c. Review Observations by CAA T Team Chief. 
This hierarchical block depicts the series of tasks that a CAAT Team 
Chief must complete to evaluate a CAAT member's CALLCOMS observation for 
relevance, completeness, accuracy, and grammatical errors.  The team chief receives the 
file by either uploading the CAAT member's electronic file from a floppy disk onto his 
PC or receiving it via FTP.  It begins with a review by the team chief that takes a time- 
value based on a random number generator following a normal distribution with a mean 
of 1.5 hours and a standard deviation of 1. Once it has been reviewed, the CALLCOMS 
observation is passed to a decision block that simulates the success rate that observation 
will have in being approved on the first attempt.   Since the observation is in electronic 
form, minor adjustments can be made by the team chief to speed the process up.   The 
102 
historical rate of success on first drafts is 30%. If the observation is approved, it is sent to 
the Analyst Review task via FTP. If the observation fails, it is sent to the Returned to 
CAAT SME for Refinement task. 
d. Returned to CAAT SME for Refinement. 
This hierarchical block depicts the series of tasks that occur when a CAAT 
Team Member gets a CALLCOMS observation returned by the CAAT Team Chief for 
corrections. The team member makes the necessary adjustments and forwards the 
CALLCOMS observation back to the team chief for another review. The time that the 
rewrite requires is based on a random number generator following a normal distribution 
with a mean of 2 hours and a standard deviation of 1. The team chief review time is 
based on a random number generator following a normal distribution with a mean of 1.5 
hours and a standard deviation of 1. Once it has been reviewed, the CALLCOMS 
observation is passed to a decision block which simulates the success rate that 
observation will have in being approved on the second attempt. The historical rate of 
success on second drafts is 70%. If the observation is approved, it is sent to the Analyst 
Review task via FTP. If the observation fails, it is passed to the Returned to CAAT SME 
for major rework. 
e. Analyst Review. 
This block depicts the tasks that occur when CALLCOMS observation is 
FTPed to the civilian analyst at Fort Leavenworth. The analyst receives the observation 
and then reviews it for content relevance, and grammatical errors. This value is 
calculated by a random number generator following a normal distribution with a mean of 
2 hours and a standard deviation of 1.   Once it has been evaluated, the observation is 
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passed to a decision block that to determine if it is sent back to the CAAT for content 
refinement or validation. The historical rate of validation is 40%. 
/ Analyst Input into CALLCOMDB. 
This block depicts a CALLCOMS observation that has been validated by 
the CAAT Team Chief and FTPed to the civilian analyst at Fort Leavenworth for input 
into the CALLCOMS DB. This value is calculated by a random number generator 
following a normal distribution with a mean of 3 hours and a standard deviation of 1.5. 
The large standard deviation is based on the priority of the analyst's effort for reviewing 
observations and providing feedback to the deployed CAAT, not on immediate input to 
the database. 
D.    CALL    OBSERVATION    COLLECTION    PROCESS    BEFORE    USING 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
1.    Purpose. 
The purpose of this model is to depict the previous CALL observation collection 
process that did not include the use of Information Technology solutions. (Figure8) 
This process incorporates the use of a "Paper and Pencil" system by the CAAT to aid in 
the collection and processing of observations in the field. It also depicts the use of fax 
machines or US Mail carriers to transmit CALLCOMS forms from forward deployed 
locations to CALL at Fort Leavenworth. 
2.   Key Tasks Depicted in the Model. 
The following tasks are pivotal in the accurate depiction of this process: 
•    Observation Collection. 
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• Draft Observation Manual Form. 
• Review Observations by CAAT Team Chief. 
• Returned to CAAT SME for Refinement. 
• Analyst Review Observations. 
• Observations Typed by CALL. 
Figure 8. CAAT Observation Collection Process w/o IT 
3. Explanation of Key Task Blocks and Data Used for Each Task. 
a. Observation Collection. 
This block of the model simulates the CAAT SMEs' daily collection of 
observations throughout their deployment in the theater of actual operations. There are 
usually 3-5 observations a day that arrive to the system in a Poisson distribution with a 
mean value of 6 hours per observation. 
b. Draft Observation Manual Form. 
This block depicts the time that it takes a CAAT member to manually 
record their observation in the correct format using preprinted paper observation shells. 
This value is calculated by a random number generator following a normal distribution 
with a mean of 2 hours and a standard deviation of 1. 
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c. Review Observations by CAA T Team Chief. 
This hierarchical block depicts the series of tasks that a CAAT Team 
Chief must  complete  to  evaluate  a  CAAT  member's  observation  for relevance, 
completeness, accuracy, and grammatical errors. The team chief receives the paper form 
when it is hand delivered by the CAAT SME.   It begins with a review by the team chief 
that takes a time-value based on a random number generator following a normal 
distribution with a mean of 2 hours and a standard deviation of 1.   Once it has been 
reviewed the observation is passed to a decision block that simulates the success rate that 
observation has of being approved on the first attempt. Since the observation is in paper 
form, corrections can be written on the page to assist the SME.   The historical rate of 
success on first drafts is 30%.  If the observation is approved, it is faxed to the Analyst 
Review task.   If the observation fails, it is passed to the Returned to CAAT SME for 
Refinement task. 
d. Returned to CAA T SME for Refinement. 
This hierarchical block depicts the series of tasks that occur when a CAAT 
Team Member gets an observation returned by the CAAT Team Chief for corrections. 
The team member rewrites the observation, making the necessary adjustments and 
delivers the corrected observation back to the team chief for another review. The time 
that the rewrite requires is based on a random number generator following a normal 
distribution with a mean of 3 hours and a standard deviation of 2. The team chief review 
time is based on a random number generator following a normal distribution with a mean 
of 1.5 hours and a standard deviation of 1. Once it has been reviewed, the observation is 
passed to a decision block which simulates the success rate that observation will have of 
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being approved on the second attempt. The historical rate of success on second drafts is 
70%. If the observation is approved it is faxed to the Analyst Review task. If the 
observation fails, it is passed to the Returned to CAAT SME for major rework. 
e.   Analyst Review Observation. 
This block depicts the tasks that occur when an observation is faxed to the 
civilian analyst at Fort Leavenworth. The analyst receives the observation and reviews it 
for content, relevance, and grammatical errors. This value is calculated by a random 
number generator following a normal distribution with a mean of 2 hours and a standard 
deviation of 1. Once it has been evaluated, the observation is passed to a decision block 
that will determine if it is sent back to the CAAT for content refinement or validation. 
The historical rate of validation is 40%. 
/ Observation Typed by CALL. 
This block depicts an observation that is validated by the CAAT Team 
Chief and faxed to the civilian analyst at Fort Leavenworth for typing so it can be 
included in the final product report. This value is calculated by a random number 
generator following a normal distribution with a mean of 6 hours and a standard deviation 
of 2. The large standard deviation is based on the typing being done by CALL secretaries 
as a secondary responsibility. 
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E.    USER    ACCESS    TO    LESSONS    IN    CALL    DB    USING    CURRENT 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
1.    Purpose. 
The purpose of this model is to depict the current process that clients of CALL 
use to access information, products, and TTP from the CALL DB. (Figure 9) This 
process incorporates the use of an Internet Portal to gain access to the CALL DB from 
various installations around the US and the world. It also depicts the use of Excalibur 
RetrievalWare to search and present files on the Client PC where they can be stored or 
printed for use. 
Figure 9. User Access to CALL DB w/IT 
2.   Key Tasks Depicted in the Model. 
The following tasks are pivotal in the accurate depiction of this process: 
• CALL Web Page Receives a Request. 
• User has Access. 
• Requests Password Be Issued. 
• Search Database. 
• Download Product. 
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3. Explanation of Key Task Blocks and Data Used for Each Task. 
a. CALL Web Page Receives a Request. 
This block of the model depicts when a client uses the Internet to gain 
access to the CALL Gateway and signs on to gain access to the CALL DB. There are 
usually 5-10 attempts a day to gain access to the CALL DB. These attempts arrive in a 
Poisson distribution with a mean value of 2 hours per observation. 
b. User has Access. 
This block is a decision variable. It is used to route the user to the 
database if they previously have been assigned a userid and password. If they do not 
have a userid, they are routed to the Request Password Be Issued task. 75% of users who 
want to gain access will already possess a userid and password. 
c. Requests Password Be Issued. 
This hierarchical block depicts the series of tasks that occur when a client 
needs to request a userid and password from CALL to gain access to the CALL DB. The 
user fills out a request form on the CALL web page and transmits it to the CALL 
headquarters section. The time to complete this task is calculated by a random number 
generator following a normal distribution with a mean of .25 hours and a standard 
deviation of 1. Once the request has been submitted, CALL confirms the user's need for 
access by contacting their military chain-of-command. This task has a mean time of 12 
hours with a standard deviation of 2. Once confirmation of the user's need for access is 
ascertained, the request is forwarded to the CALL Director for final approval. This task 
has a 75% probability of success. If approval is granted, a userid and password is issued 
and mailed to the requester via US Mail.   This task is a uniform distribution with a 
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maximum time of 6 days and a minimum of 2 days.   If the request is denied, a letter 
informing the client of why the request was turned down is sent via US Mail as well. 
d. Search Database. 
This activity depicts the user searching the CALL DB with Excalibur 
RetrievalWare to find the information, TTPs, or products they require from CALL. The 
time of this task is determined by a random number generator using a normal distribution 
with a mean of 1 hour with a standard deviation of 1. 
e. Download Product. 
This activity simulates the user downloading the required products from 
the CALL DB using a 56k-modem communication link. The time of this task is 
determined by a random number generator creating a file size between 10KB and 50MB 
and then dividing the file size by the connection speed. 
F.    USER ACCESS  TO  LESSONS  PRIOR TO  CURRENT INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY ARCHITECTURE 
1.    Purpose. 
The purpose of this model is to depict the previous process that clients of CALL 
use to access information, products, and TTP from the CALL DB. (Figure 10) This 
process illustrates the use of a telephone to call in a request for assistance to CALL. 
Once CALL receives the request, it is assigned to one of the three civilian analysts. The 
analyst searches through CALL's information repositories and packages the information 
for the user. The information is then sent to the user via the US Mail. 
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2.   Key Tasks Depicted in the Model. 
The following tasks are pivotal in the accurate depiction of this process: 
• CALL Receives a Request from a Client. 
• Analyst Searches for Information. 
• Information Sent to User via US Mail. 
IsJbr iMttoa /Publication 
MiQrd to UKI 
Vim US Mafl 
Figure 10. User Access to CALL Lessons Learned w/o IT 
3. Explanation of Key Task Blocks and Data Used for Each Task. 
a. CALL Receives a Request from a Client. 
This block of the model depicts when a client contacts CALL via 
telephone to request assistance on finding information, a particular CALL product, or 
copies of current TTPs. There are usually 2-3 attempts to gain information from CALL 
a day that arrive to the system in a Poisson distribution with a mean value of 12 hours per 
observation. 
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b. Analyst Searches for Information. 
This activity depicts the hierarchical process that the civilian analyst 
undergoes in searching the CALL repositories and products to find the requested 
information and then tailor the products to meet the client's specific needs. The time for 
the task of finding the required information is determined by a random number generator 
using a normal distribution with a mean of 12 hour with a standard deviation of 2. Once 
the information has been identified, the next task is tailoring and packaging the 
information so it can be mailed to the client. The time for this task is determined using a 
normal distribution with a mean of 12 hours and a standard deviation of 1. 
c. Information Sent to User via US Mail. 
This task depicts the time it takes for the tailored package of information 
to be sent via US Mail to the client. This task is a uniform distribution with a maximum 
time of 6 days and a minimum of 2 days. 
G. SIMULATION RESULTS 
To simulate the Observation Collection Process, each of the models was run for a 
duration of 30 days, which is about the standard amount of time that a CAAT does actual 
collection operations. Table 1 depicts the results of the simulations. 
# of 30 Day Simulations 
# Observations 
Total Time (Days) 
MeanTime (Days) 
Standard Deviation (Days) 
Confidence Level 
Collection Collection 







Table 3. Extend Collection Process Model Data 
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To measure user accessibility to information from CALL, the two simulations for these 
process were run multiple times for a duration of 60 days each. The results are listed in 
Table 4. 
Database 
Access w/ IT 
Data Access 
w/o IT 
# of 60 Day Simulations 
# Observations 
Total Time (Days) 
Mean Time (Days) 











Table 4. Extend User Access Model Data 
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APPENDIX B.   SURVEY OF CALL CLIENTS 
A. SURVEY DESIGN 
The survey was designed to collect both objective and subjective data. The 
purpose of the objective survey items is to collect data on the specific level of users 
knowledge of the services that CALL provides for members of the Army. Subjective 
items were included to gather the perceptions and opinions of the users on the 
effectiveness of CALL in providing meaningful lessons, products, or TTPs. 
B. SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS 
The focus of the selection of respondents was to identify the group within the 
Army to whom CALL products are primarily targeted. Since most of CALL'S products 
are oriented on the tactical level of doctrine and focus on Brigade and lower level topics, 
its key target group is company grade officers. 
The reason that company grade officers are a critical target group is two fold. 
First, they serve in many of the key company and platoon leadership positions throughout 
the Army. In these positions they are responsible for the planning and supervision of the 
individual and collective training within their units and deployment during combat.   If 
CALL'S products can effect the way training is planned or the method by which it is 
conducted, through its TTPs and lessons, it will be disseminated down to the individual 
level resulting in the widest possible impact on the force.  Secondly, a key aspect of the 
Army's Officer Professional Development Program is based on commander's training 
their subordinates on the latest warfighting Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.   CALL 
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can identify itself as an invaluable asset earlier in these officers' careers, it is likely that 
they will use the latest TTPs outlined in CALL products in the development of their 
subordinates and throughout the remainder of their careers. 
Once the key target group was identified, they could be questioned to provide 
insights on CALL'S products, dissemination channels, and overall impact on training. 
Thirty-Five respondents were identified to participate in the survey from the Combined 
Arms Officer Advance Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky. All of the respondents were 
required to have a general knowledge of CALL'S mission within the Army. They 
included representatives from all the major combat arms branches to include Armor, 
Infantry, Field Artillery, and Aviation. Additionally, each respondent was required to 
have served as a Platoon Leader or Executive Officer and at least one-third of the 
respondents had to serve as a Company Commander or a Battalion Staff Officer. 
C.     SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
The survey instrument used a combination of yes/no questions reflecting user's 
knowledge of the services provided by CALL, as well as open ended questions designed 
to gain subjective perceptions about CALL effectiveness. Respondents were informed 
that research would be conducted on a non-attribution basis, and that they would remain 
anonymous. It was believed that anonymous input would result in a more candid 
disclosure of information. The survey contained three sections. 
116 
1. Section One. 
Section one asked respondents to answer questions concerning aspects of their 
military career, to include: Current Rank, Duty Status, Branch, Duty Positions Served, 
Duty Stations, and Number of Years in Service. This information was used to ensure that 
a wide breadth of experiences throughout the Army would be sampled. 
2.        Section Two. 
Section two contained questions to determine the respondents knowledge of 
CALL, the services that it provides, and the level of their interaction with the 
organization. Participants were asked to answer a series of objective yes/no questions on 
CALL, its products, and the Information Technology solutions they currently employ. 
The answers to these questions will provide data that is an adequate representation of the 
company grade officer's overall knowledge and usage of CALL products and services. 











Have you ever read a CALL Product? 
1 




[       YES I         NO 
Have you ever directly used a TTP suggestion 
product to improve your training? 
or other informal* 
I       YES 1         NO 
Did you know CALL hay a website with B database of all tcsson- 
from the past and current copies of products on the Internet? 
|        YES 1         NO 
Have you ever used CALL"» webpage? 
|       YES 1        NO 
Have you ever-contacted CALL for assistance 
[      YES 1        NO 
Have you ever provided input to CALL? 
I       YES 1         NO 
What media formal have you seen used lor CALL products? 
|     E-m.il     |          CD          | PAPER         | WEB      | 
How often do you read materiel from CALL? 
1     Neva    I     Scldum     1     Once.      1   Quarterly M_Mv |    W«k v    j  Conbnully 1 
Ifyou answer yes to Question I. Which publx ations have you read? 
|      CTC     1   CTCQrtly   1   CTC Trend»   1 Sped fie Topic 1 From the 1 
1    Trend.    |      Bulletin      |      Ainlv.ii      [     Xmlctteu.    I     Front     |   N 
CALL     1 
Figure 11. User Survey Section Two 
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3.        Section Three. 
Section three gathered respondent's subjective opinions of CALL's impact on the 
Army, adaptation of Information Technology to disseminate lessons learned, and which 
clients get the greatest utility from its products. Respondents were given the opportunity 
to give a brief narrative to explain the factors that influenced their answer. The questions 
from section three of the survey are shown as Figure 12. 
Section Three 
I.   What Individuals get the most utility out of CALL'S products? 
2.    In your experience, at what level is CALL'S products disseminated down to? 
I   INDIV   |       PLT       1        CO        j BN |      BDE      j 
Is that an appropriate level? 
3.    Do you think CALL'S electronic/Web Based dissemination strategy is working? 
4.   What do you think is CALLs impact on the Army? 
5.   What could CALL do differently to have a better impact? 
Figure 12. User Survey Section Three 
D.    SURVEY RESPONSE STATISTICS 
Of the 35 surveys that were sent out to prospective respondents, a total of 31 were 
returned for a response rate of 88.6%. Responses were received from members of all 
the combat arms branches. Additionally, 83.9% of the responses had served as both a 
Platoon Leader and Company Executive Officer, 41.9% had served as Company 
Commander, and 45.2% as a Battalion Staff Officer. The cumulative experience level of 
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the response was sufficient in finding that the sample provides adequate data to reach 
general conclusions on the scope of company grade officer's knowledge of CALL and its 
products. The collected data is also sufficient to reach findings on the effectiveness of 
CALL in achieving its mission, at least within this key target group. A summary of 
survey section two response findings are depicted in Table 6 and Table 7 . 







.     •    ■ : 
friH^ffif^*^^***''*^*?14^ 
_. ••*■— ■• • — K-:-     i 
0.0%       10.0%     20.0%     30.0%     40.0%     50.0%     60.0%     70.0%     80.0%     90.0%    100.0% 
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 
■ No 9.7% 45.2% 41.9% 54.8% 80.6% 86.2% 
0Yes 90.3% 54.8% 58.1% 45.2% 19.4% 13.8% 
Percentage 
HYes MNo 
Table 6. Survey Section Two Results For Questions 1-6 
Survey section three results identified 75% of the respondents feeling that 
information and products from CALL were of value to the Army and company grade 
officer in particular, however they felt that the products were under utilized. Their 
various reasons included: Paper copies not being disseminated by Battalion senior 
leadership to their units, CALL not "advertising" the usefulness of its products, or lack of 
access to computer systems that are linked to the Internet or with E-mail capability. 
Another important finding is the respondents answer to the question concerning which 
group within the Army gets the most utility from CALLs products. 40% of the subjective 
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answers identified company grade officers serving in commander or battalion staff 
positions, an additional 20% of the responses identified small unit leaders at the company 
n 7.   Modia Formats Employed Question 8.  CALL Product Usage 
Question 9.   Publications Users Have 
CALL Newsletter 
27% 
From The Front' 
Topic Newsletters 
17% 
Table 7. Survey Section Two Results For Questions 7-9 
or lower level.   These indicate that CALL users agree that the key group for CALL to 
target to improve the use of its services is the company grade officer. 
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